139. Germany and Italy Disturbed by Japanese-American Negotiations.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Carrying out previous arrangements to visit Premier Mussolini, Ambassador Oshima left for Rome on May 10, 1941, the day after his interview with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop.http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us
[559] II, 531.
[560] II, Ibid.
[561] II, Ibid.
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Two days later, the German Ambassador O. Furst von Bismarck, acting under instructions from his Foreign Minister, called on Ambassador Oshima to show him the German government’s instructions to Ambassador Eugene Ott in Tokyo. Both Italy and Germany had concurred in the statement which outlined the second of the German proposals, the one which Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had opposed. Chancellor Hitler had approved this second proposal, which had won the support of Ambassador Oshima.
Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop arrived by plane to confer with Premier Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano in Rome on May 13, 1941, and on the morning of May 14, 1941, he conferred with Ambassador Oshima. Expressing great dissatisfaction with Mr. Matsuoka’s explanation as to why the Japanese-American negotiations had been started without awaiting Italian and German views, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop stated that if Mr. Matsuoka had waited only a few hours longer before replying to the United States he would have received their opinions.
Ambassador Oshima declared that he did not know the facts of the situation, but thought that his Foreign Minister’s action was due to the necessity of assuring absolute secrecy, and because the Emperor’s approval had to be obtained. No disrespect had been intended for either Italy or Germany.
The German Foreign Minister was very disturbed because Foreign Minister Matsuoka had not mentioned the Japanese-American negotiations during his recent trip to Germany, despite the fact that they had a great bearing on the Tripartite Pact. Herr von Ribbentrop did not disguise his opinion that the negotiations had weakened the Pact, that President Roosevelt was not to be trusted, that Japanese negotiations with the United States should be abandoned, and that he did not approve of the German proposal which had received the support of Chancellor Hitler.
On the evening of this same day, Ambassador Oshima conferred with Foreign Minister Ciano who expressed views similar to those of the German Foreign Minister. [562]
140. Germany Alleges That Mr. Matsuoka Promised Japan’s Aid in a War Against Russia.
When Ambassador Oshima returned to Berlin on May 17, 1941, he was requested to call on Vice Minister Weizsacker. Acting under instructions from Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, the Vice Minister showed Ambassador Oshima a telegram from Ambassador Ott in Tokyo dealing with the Japanese reply to the United States’ proposal, and Germany’s instructions to Ambassador Ott concerning this reply. The German Vice Minister expressed his government’s great concern with the outcome of this question, and stated that Germany was greatly interested in Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s statement to Ambassador Ott that Japan would aid Germany in case of a German-Russian war.
When asked whether Mr. Matsuoka was fully acquainted with German-Russian relations, Ambassador Oshima replied that his Foreign Minister had had many opportunities to talk with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop concerning these relations during his visit to Germany. As for the Japanese position in the event of a German-Russian war, all important questions of state had to be approved by the Emperor, and, consequently, any statement by Foreign Minister Matsuoka was merely an expression of his own personal views. [563]
In another report on May 19, 1941, Ambassador Oshima stressed Germany’s dissatisfaction with regard to the proposed Japanese-American agreement. Germany was concerned over the
[562] II, Ibid.
[563] II, Ibid.
119
future of the Tripartite Pact, because its official circles felt that Japan’s entrance into an agreement with the United States would be the same as giving approval to the violent anti-Axis actions of the United States. Although the agreement might prevent the entrance of the United States into the European war, it would indicate to the German people that Japan was evading its duty to enter the war. After the warm welcome awarded to Mr. Matsuoka on his recent visit, and the strengthening of ties among Axis nations, many Germans felt that they had been betrayed by the recent action of Japan. [564]
Ambassador Oshima recognized the fact that Japan needed a political and economic breathing spell which could be brought about by settling the China incident, but he pointed out that Germany and Italy were winning the European war and, therefore, it would be unwise for the sake of some immediate gains to lose the friendship of the Axis powers. Ambassador Oshima emphasized Foreign Minister Ribbentrop’s belief that the agreement proposed by the United States was motivated only by its desire to separate Japan from the Axis. If Japan left the Axis, it would stand alone in international affairs during the critical period immediately following the war. If Japan abandoned its plan to expand southward and discontinued its threat to Singapore, Ambassador Oshima believed that Japan would be looked upon contemptuously not only by Britain and the United States, but by Germany and Italy as well. [565]
Furthermore, a Japanese-American agreement would mean that Japan was abandoning its claims to the establishment of a “New Order” in Greater East Asia, and the Japanese people would become confused as to the ultimate national goal. While very much opposed to any Japanese-American negotiations, Ambassador Oshima suggested that if Japan felt it necessary to enter into an agreement, the following points should be put into effect:
(a) Japan was entering into an agreement with the United States to support the spirit of the Tripartite Pact and to make things easier for Germany and Italy in their war against England.
(b) America was to change her policy with regard to the European war to one of strict neutrality at the same time that Japan clearly set forth the conditions of the Tripartite Pact under which it would be bound to enter the war.
(c) Germany and Italy should not be permitted to think that certain Japanese groups, urging the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East as opposed to expansion of the militarists, had gained so much power that Japan had been forced to enter into an agreement with America. [566]
Ambassador Oshima also stressed the need for exchanging opinions with Germany and Italy so that they could be reassured of Japan’s intention to adhere to the Tripartite Pact. [567]
141. Japan Stresses Its Allegiance to Axis.
On May 24, 1941 Mr. Matsuoka replied that he could understand the reasons for Ambassador Oshima’s agitation over the negotiations, but reiterated that Japan would do nothing to contravene the spirit of the Tripartite Pact which was the cornerstone of Japan’s national policy. According to Mr. Matsuoka, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and other German officials should have no anxiety or misunderstanding concerning Japanese acts. [568]
The Japanese Foreign Minister stressed that in view of the measures he had taken since he had returned to Japan, and because of the statements made by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull, the United States was well aware of the Japanese determination to support the
[564] II, 532.
[565] II, Ibid.
[566] II, Ibid.
[567] II, 532-533.
[568] II, 534.
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Tripartite Pact. Stating that he did not know what was in the back of President Roosevelt’s mind, and remarking that no one else did either, Foreign Minister Matsuoka agreed in general with the assumption of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop that London and Washington were attempting to separate the Axis powers by diplomacy. [569]
Commenting on the fact that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop was disturbed because Japan had begun the negotiations with the United States before receiving any views from Germany, Mr. Matsuoka pointed out that he had delayed his answer almost four weeks from the date of the original proposal by the United States. On May 8, 1941 Tokyo had received a confidential report that the American Congress had approved the convoy policy, and that President Roosevelt was to approve it on May 14, 1941. Since Japan had been anxious to prevent the United States from approving convoys in order to eliminate the danger of American participation in the war, the Japanese counter proposal had been suddenly put forth on May 12, 1941. [570]
Mr. Matsuoka denied that he had acted in response to pressure from any Japanese group, and again insisted that his reason for not informing the Germans was to maintain security. The Japanese counter proposal had been successful because President Roosevelt had postponed his speech scheduled for May 14, 1941. Defending his position of withholding information, the Japanese Foreign Minister said he would continue to keep in touch with the Germans and Italians, but since Japan was a free country it was unnecessary to run to Germany and Italy for advice on every problem. [571]
In Moscow, Ambassador Yoshitsugu Tatekawa had learned in mid-May 1941 from the American Ambassador that conversations had started between Ambassador Grew and the Japanese Foreign Minister, possibly in regard to the question of the United States’ aid to China. He had informed the American Ambassador, who had stressed the impossibility of a Japanese-American war, that if a war between America and Germany were provoked by the American fleet, Japan was obligated by the terms of the Tripartite treaty to fight against America. [572]
142. Foreign Minister Matsuoka Attempts to Prevent German-Russian War.
On May 27, 1941 Mr. Matsuoka denied that in a conversation with Ambassador Ott he had promised Japan’s entrance into a German-Russian war. According to the Japanese Foreign Minister, he had indicated the impossibility of foretelling the attitude of Japan in such an event, though he had said that he could not visualize Japan’s not striking at Russia, if Germany went to war. [573]
On the following day, May 28, 1941, Ambassador Oshima was ordered to deliver the following message to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop:
In view of the current international situation which so deeply involves my country, and of the internal situation within Japan, this minister sincerely hopes that the German Government, insofar as is possible, will avoid a military clash with the Soviet. [574]
Mr. Matsuoka continued trying to avert a Russian-German war until the outbreak of hostilities, and though he seemed to realize the futility of his efforts on June 20, 1941, he still hoped for a change in Germany’s attitude. [575]
[569] II, 535
[570] II, Ibid.
[571] II, Ibid.
[572] II, 536
[573] II, 537.
[574] II, 538.
[575] II, 539-540.
121
143. Japan Informs Its Diplomats of the Japanese-American Negotiations.
On May 27, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Office informed its diplomats in Moscow, England, France, and Italy of the Japanese-American negotiations which were in progress in Washington. According to this message, Japan had entered negotiations with a view to maintaining the Tripartite Pact as the basis of its national policy, preventing the United States from convoying ships to England or from entering the war, and lastly, having the United States cease its aid to China. Important details of the proposed agreement were outlined, and a warning to keep the negotiations secret was issued. [576]
144. Japan Loses by Economic Collaboration with Germany.
Adherence to the Tripartite Pact in conjunction with its “New Order in East Asia” was beginning, as early as May 1941, to cause Japan no little concern over its already heavily burdened shipping. Conditions in Europe and South America had made the purchase and leasing of ship bottoms exceptionally difficult, and conversion of merchant vessels for military use had cut Japan’s commercial shipping to sixty per cent of its former capacity. Accordingly, on May 12, 1941, Mr. Matsuoka informed Ambassador Oshima in Berlin of the great sacrifice Japan would be forced to make, if Germany were furnished additional aid. [577]
Not only in regard to shipping was Japan suffering losses for the sake of its alliance with Germany, but its all-important rubber markets in French Indo-China, the Netherlands East Indies and Thailand were cornered by German merchants, who operated without regard to price. By mid-May 1941, the situation had become so acute that some Japanese factories were shut down, thereby forcing a request to Ambassador Ott that Germany permit Japan to appropriate one half of the new consignment of rubber from French Indo-China which was scheduled to arrive soon in Japan for reshipment. This amount would be replaced as quickly as conditions permitted. [578]
Negotiations with Germany in regard to increasing Japan’s tin allotment were also under way, but though experiencing a shortage, Japan agreed to purchase and refine one hundred and fifty tons of ore for consignment to Italy. [579] Since German newspapers were also manifesting a great interest in Japanese-Dutch trade negotiations, Japanese authorities feared that some jurisdictional dispute concerning Greater East Asia might occur. [580]
Not until June 20, 1941, after further bargaining, was the Japanese request answered by the Chief of the German Commerce Bureau in Berlin. According to a new proposition, Japan was to receive twenty-five hundred tons of rubber; there would be no further hindrance to its purchase of rubber from Indo-China and Thailand; and the amount left over, after shipments had been made to the United States and France, would be divided between Japan and Germany. [581]
[576] II, 541.
[577] II, 542.
[578] II, 543-544.
[579] II, 545.
[580] II, 546
[581] II, 547-548.
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
145. Strengthening of Japanese-German Political Ties.
Despite its economic losses from collaboration with Germany in the Far East, Japan continued to cement diplomatic relations by doing favors for the Germans. In late May 1941, Tokyo directed its Minister in Mexico to receive $200,000 in American money from the German Minister for transfer to Berlin, via a Japanese ship to Tokyo. [582] But in turn a request was made by Tokyo, on June 9, 1941, that Major General Takuma Shimoyama be received at Berlin in the newly created position of Military Attaché for Aviation. [583]
146. Japanese-Italian Collaboration.
Japanese-Italian solidarity was fostered through the Japanese Foreign Office and through the cultural activities of the Japanese International Cultural Advancement Society. [584] In order to awaken Italian interest in Japan, the Japanese Ambassador in Rome requested that an increased amount of Japanese publications be sent from Tokyo every twenty days. [585] In addition he discouraged any efforts toward furthering Japanese trade in Italy, and for this reason he advised that the head of a Japanese trade promotion office, who was disliked by his fellow Japanese in Rome, was considered unsuitable to fill the Commercial Attaché post. [586]
According to a Japanese report, Germany had agreed that when the Axis had conquered Europe, Italy was to dominate the Mediterranean and Egypt. [587]
147. Japanese Estimate of German Strength (June 3, 1941).
On June 3, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin reported that Hitler would conclude the war as soon as possible after a great battle which would take place in any of the following forms:
(a) A direct attack and occupation of England proper;
(b) A complete sweeping away of English power from the Eastern Mediterranean;
(c) A war embracing Iraq;
(d) North African battle taking place in Egypt and Suez;
(e) The taking of Gibraltar;
(f) A war in the territory surrounding Dakar;
(g) Finally, a war against the Soviet. [588]
Germany’s plans to pulverize the British Empire, and at the same time to defend German boundaries, impressed Ambassador Oshima and his economic and military attaches, who believed that Germany could also annihilate the Russian army within a short period. [589]
It was estimated, in this same report of June 3, 1941, that the German naval, air and army forces numbered from 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 men, 10,000 to 15,000 first class fighter planes, 20,000 second class fighters, 30,000 training and civilian aircraft, and monthly production amounting to 2,000 planes. Only 40,000 men had been killed in all battles since the beginning of the war. Aircraft and submarine production dominated the Axis industrial output, for the Germans had been very successful in their attacks on English shipping by these methods. [590]
[582] II, 549.
[583] II, 550-551.
[584] II, 552.
[585] II, 553.
[586] II, 554.
[587] II, 555.
[588] II, 556.
[589] II, 557.
[590] II, 558.
123
A Japanese summary of German war reports from June 1 to June 15, 1941 announced the destruction of 177,400 tons of British shipping by aerial attack, and 128,800 tons by submarine. [591]
Though sincerely believing in the powerful “New Order” in Germany and its ability to wage war, Ambassador Oshima observed that the German people, in general, desired peace, despite Chancellor Hitler’s ambition to bring England to annihilation. [592] Chancellor Hitler had informed Ambassador Oshima that Great Britain had invited Germany to join with her in clamping down on Italy in 1935, but suspecting that after the subjugation of Italy, Germany’s downfall would follow, he had refused. [593]
148. Germany Protests Against Criticism by Japanese Press.
Although the Japanese press, according to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop on June 4, 1941, was releasing articles in an attempt to divorce Japan and Germany, actually the Japanese Empire continued more and more solidly to support the Hitler program, since apparently it was much impressed by German success. Attempting to vindicate his government, Ambassador Oshima explained to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop that though the rigid control exercised over the press in Germany did not exist in Japan, the Japanese thoroughly supported the Tripartite principles. [594]
149. Croatia Signs the Tripartite Pact.
Croatia was invited on June 5, 1941 to join the Tripartite powers. Dr. Ante Pavelic of Zagreb was to be Premier and Foreign Minister of this newly recognized government. Arrangements were made to have the agreement signed in the presence of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in Venice on June 14, 1941. [595]
150. Japan Assists an Axis-Supported Indian Revolutionary.
Japan was interested in the activities of Mr. Subhas Bose, a leader of a group of the Congress Party, who after deportation from India, had been living in Berlin. [596] Learning from the Italian Foreign Office, on June 4, 1941, that Mr. Bose was in Rome but had not as yet conferred with Premier Mussolini or Foreign Minister Ciano, Japan planned not to make a public commitment, since it felt that he might not be a capable revolutionary leader. [597] However, Japan offered to act as liaison between Mr. Bose and his party of a million supporters in the province of Bengal. [598]
151. Germany’s Attitude Toward Portugal (June 1941).
Although in early June 1941 Spain was expected to join the Tripartite Pact, German authorities did not believe that Hitler would exert pressure on Portugal to make it follow suit. [599]
[591] II, 559.
[592] II, 560.
[593] II, 561.
[594] II, 562.
[595] II, 563.
[596] II, 564-565.
[597] II, Ibid.
[598] II, 565.
[599] II, 566.
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
152. Japan Congratulates Germany on the Fall of Crete.
Great accomplishments of Germany in World War II were the landing of troops on Crete early in May 1941, and the final annexation of the island in June 1941, after some unexpected resistance. [600] In referring to the Battle of Crete, Hitler told Ambassador Oshima that victory had been obtained entirely by new aerial tactics and that twelve thousand prisoners had been captured and eight battleships destroyed. [601]
On June 6, 1941 Ambassador Zenbei Horikiri in Rome called to congratulate Foreign Minister Ciano on the Axis conquest of Crete. Further moves against Alexandria and the Suez Canal were suggested by Ambassador Horikiri, who also expressed his belief that defeat of the British Isles would not be too difficult. In reply, Foreign Minister Ciano stated that Britain’s home defenses, its fleet and air arms would make invasion somewhat costly. Furthermore, any move in North Africa would not be without a struggle. [602] As final resistance crumbled in Crete, however, the swiftly moving German Luftwaffe began to bomb Alexandria, Haifa and Cyprus. [603]
153. Vichy Begins to Collaborate with Germany. [604]
Tokyo was informed as early as May 10, 1941, that current discussions were facilitating German-French collaboration. [605] Negotiations between German authorities and Vice Premier Darlan were expected to culminate in new and better relations between these two governments. On May 14, 1941 Ambassador Kato at Vichy reviewed the Darlan-Hitler conference on May 12, 1941. According to a German Foreign Office staff member, the meeting of the two leaders had ensured German-French political and military cooperation. Collaboration would include Germany’s use of sea and air bases in the French colonies in North Africa, supply lines in Syria and the French Navy. In return France was to be assured of the preservation of its Empire and colonies. [606] The authoritative German spokesman also predicted that Admiral Darlan, rather than Mr. Pierre Laval, would originate all further policies concerning Germany and France, since conversations between Admiral Darlan and Chancellor Hitler had been conducted at Berchtesgaden in a most amiable atmosphere. [607]
As proof of the friendly relations between the two governments, France obtained the release of 100,000 prisoners on May 19, 1941, as well as a reduction in the maintenance cost of Germany’s army of occupation to 240,000,000 francs per day. [608] Ambassador Kato believed that the German-Vichy negotiations had been quite successful, and he remarked that Marshal Henri Petain’s address of May 15, 1941 would influence French opinion in favor of Germany.
According to the Japanese Ambassador, relations between the United States and France took an unexpected turn for the worse after President Roosevelt, in a statement on May 15, 1941, had warned France against collaboration with Germany, and had then ordered guards to be placed aboard eleven French ships, including the Normandie, which were in American ports. Furthermore, Marshal Petain informed Ambassador Leahy that the assistance accorded France by the United States was not sufficient. [609]
[600] II, 567.
[601] II, 561.
[602] II, 568.
[603] II, 559.
[604] See Japanese-French Relations, Part C. Sections 198-199.
[605] II, 569.
[606] II, 570.
[607] II, 555.
[608] II, 571.
[609] II, Ibid.
125
The Japanese Ambassador at Rome stated on June 7, 1941 that France was expected to contract a peace treaty with Germany and Italy, and at the same time the questions of Croatia and Nice would be settled. Since French leaders were reported as ready to sign the Tripartite Pact, Japanese authorities believed that this would aid them in the Japanese-French Indo-China economic situation. [610]
154. Great Britain Opposes Vichy.
Meanwhile, the Japanese Ambassador in London, following his talk with the British Foreign Minister on or about June 6, 1941, had reported on British-French sentiment. Though recognizing that Mr. Pierre Laval, Admiral Darlan and Marshal Petain wished most ardently that Great Britain would follow Vichy and would assist in bringing about an early peace in Europe, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden announced that Great Britain was determined to finish the war, even though it had to act alone. He believed, however, that the biggest part of the French populace was not with Vichy in spirit. [611]
Three divisions of British troops, with some deGaullists and Abyssinians, invaded Syria in early June 1941, and according to Ambassador Kato’s report of his conversation with General Huntziger, the French Minister of War, French defenses were exceptionally weak. However, the French Minister believed that the British advance could be temporarily halted. [612] Japanese sources from Turkey reported that despite French efforts to render assistance, Axis negotiations with Turkey for the transport of arms through Turkish territory had come to naught, and as a result, Syria would fall under the rule of British forces. [613]
155. Japanese Concern Over British Control of Iraq.
It was apparent to Japanese representatives that Axis interests in Iraq would be impeded by the new pro-British government, which had been established by Emir Abdul Illah to succeed the Cabinet of Premier Rashid Ali el Gailani, whose Iraqi Army, composed principally of doubtful Kirkuk-Mosul troops, had been crushed by the British. [614] Japanese agents in the Near and Middle East felt that unless Germany and Italy immediately counteracted the British influence, the whole Arabian movement of the Axis might be severely imperiled.
Ambassador Horikiri expressed his concern about Syria and Iraq to Foreign Minister Ciano on June 6, 1941. [615] This fear was well founded, for, on June 4, 1941, a definite rupture between Iraq and Italy had occurred, when Minister Muzahim Al-Pachachi, residing in Rome, had received orders to return home. To maintain Japanese harmony with Iraq, Japanese representatives in Rome were urged by their colleagues in Baghdad to finance the return of Minister Al-Pachachi. [616]
156. Turkey Signs Commercial Agreement with Germany.
Demands for support were made upon Turkey from all quarters as it attempted to preserve its neutrality. The Axis nations even considered the transfer of Syria to Turkey in exchange
[610] II, 672
[611] II, 573.
[612] II, 574.
[613] II, 575.
[614] II, 576-577.
[615] II, 578-580, 563.
[616] II, 581.
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for its support. However, as time passed, the Axis nations were encouraged by Turkey’s attitude for the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin states, on May 22, 1941, that although Turkey had remained neutral, it was in fact becoming more closely allied with the Axis since it not only permitted Axis supplies to cross through Turkish territory, but was also expecting to be of assistance in an Axis move against India. [617]
On June 18, 1941 Turkey took an important step in staving off an attack from the west when German Ambassador Franz von Papen and Foreign Minister Shukru Saracoglu signed a Turkish-German Pact. Reporting the formulation of this pact to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Turkish Ambassador Tek, resident in Tokyo, was reassured by Mr. Matsuoka as to Chancellor Hitler’s “high ideals” and also as to Turkey’s good judgment in culminating such a treaty. Turkish diplomats took care to stipulate, however, that this treaty admitted no passage of troops through their neutral territory, though a comprehensive commercial pact would be contracted between Turkey and Germany. [618]
157. Japan Persuades Germany to Eliminate Pro-Chinese German Officials.
On July 3, 1941 Ambassador Oshima conferred with the German Ambassador to China, Henrich D. Stahmer, and requested that German officials in China, who were well known for pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese attitudes, be replaced by Germans who were more deeply imbued with the spirit of National Socialism. The German Ambassador agreed to present the matter to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, and Ambassador Oshima’s request for the names of anti-Japanese Germans was forwarded by Tokyo to all Japanese officials in China. [619]
158. German Merchants Seek Chinese Markets.
As time went on, Japanese officials became increasingly concerned with German policy in regard to its merchants in the Far East. Having learned from intelligence sources on July 9, 1941, that the German Economic Ministry had issued secret instructions to German merchants in Shanghai which would promote German control of trade, Mr. Matsuoka urged his representatives to impress upon Germany the need for a retraction of such orders, and to stress the necessity for fostering Japanese and German commercial equality. Should Germany not comply, Japan revealed that it would insist upon all of Japan’s business being conducted through Japanese merchants. He urged that immediate action be taken to avert a serious break in relations. [620]
According to the Japanese, a group of German diplomatic officials was primarily concerned with its own immediate financial and commercial interests, and, therefore, Japanese restrictions on shipping, residence and transit in China had tended to create a consistently unfriendly attitude on the part of these men toward the Japanese Empire. [621] Another group of German officials, however, stressed the need for political concert between Germany, Japan and Manchukuo, but even this group, which had recognized the Nanking government and, thus, was able to negotiate with it, might also cause a delicate situation. [622]
[617] II, 567.
[619] II, 582.
[619] II, 583-584.
[620] II, 585.
[621] II, 586.
[622] II, Ibid.
127
On July 31, 1941 Tokyo urged Ambassador Oshima in Berlin to prevent situations leading to anti-Japanese and pro-Chungking conduct on the part of German merchants, such as the transfer of captured enemy shipping, and the violation of shipping rules. [623]
159. Japan Seeks a German-Nanking Commercial Agreement.
Looking forward to the establishment of a “New Order” in the Far East, Japan believed that a comprehensive agreement between Germany and China, with recognition of the leading positions of Japan and Germany, should be concluded at the end of the war. Since a large scale war in China was still under way, however, it seemed best that as individual questions came up, immediate friendly settlements should be made by an agreement between Japan, Germany and China. Several new clauses were to be added to the present German-Chinese treaty in order to grant special privileges to the signatories in the area in which they held leadership. [624] Complaints from the German Consul General in Shanghai were received at Tokyo in July 1941 concerning the treatment being accorded to Germans in China. Impressed by these complaints, Japan recognized the necessity for according favorable treatment to Germans in China in order to improve German relationships with the new Nanking government. [625] A simple agreement, stipulating a most favored nation treatment for Germans in China, was suggested, but Japanese representatives in Nanking and Shanghai were directed to deal adroitly with the situation to ensure the special position of the new Chinese-Mongolian border as an area of joint Japanese-Chinese policy. [626]
160. Japan Reports a Lull in Japanese-American Negotiations.
On July 17, 1941 Mr. Matsuoka declared that his government had not been pressing the United States for an understanding, and that no concrete action had been taken for a month after the United States had submitted its supposedly final proposal in late June 1941. During this period of delay, whenever the German and Italian Ambassadors to Tokyo had sought some information as to the contents of the United States proposal, Mr. Matsuoka had stated merely that the provisions were slipshod and were not acceptable. However, he had not discontinued the negotiations abruptly because they affected both the domestic and foreign policy of Japan. Declaring that any treaty reached with the United States would have to be based on the Tripartite Pact, he stated that there was very little chance of reaching an agreement. [626a] http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us
The German Ambassador to Tokyo informed Vice Minister Chuichi Ohashi on July 22, 1941 that Germany opposed the Japanese-American negotiations, and in view of the successes of Germany in the Russian war, Japan had better decide immediately on its course of future action. Remarking that Japan would occupy Southern French Indo-China in the next few days, and that this seizure would be merely a preparatory step for future activities, Vice Minister Ohashi pointed out that Germany’s insistence on influencing Japan’s national policy might possibly have an adverse effect on Axis relations. [626b]
161. Foreign Minister Matsuoka Resigns (July 18, 1941).
Japan’s announcement of its neutrality in regard to the German-Russian war did not dispose of a critical internal situation at home. On July 16, 1941 Foreign Minister Matsuoka con-
[623] II, Ibid.
[624] II, 587.
[625] II, 588.
[626] II, 589.
[626a] II, 590.
[626b] II, 591.
128
fided in Ambassador Oshima that Japan’s situation had looked so impossible when he had taken office that he had felt that nothing on earth could have saved it. However, it had always been his policy to attempt everything within his power to effect a solution. Nevertheless, Japan was now in a terrible predicament and Mr. Matsuoka was experiencing many tribulations. [626c] Some hint of what caused Mr. Matsuoka’s anxiety was discerned on July 18, 1941 when, after a meeting of the Japanese Cabinet, Mr. Matsuoka was replaced by Admiral Teijiro Toyoda as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Ambassador Horikiri in Rome pointed out that genuine sympathy was felt in Italy for Mr. Matsuoka, because he had succeeded in bringing about a union of the three Axis countries. Most Italians now believed that the status quo could not be maintained in the light of the Japanese change, but Japan emphasized that the shift in its Cabinet signified only the strengthening of popular unity, and would not impair its allegiance to the Tripartite Pact. [626d] According to Ambassador Horikiri, Japan’s unshakable determination made a favorable impression upon authorities in Rome, who, nevertheless, continued to watch Japan’s actions. [626e]
On July 24, 1941 in a message to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop of Germany and on July 25, 1941 in a formal statement to Foreign Minister Ciano of Italy, Mr. Matsuoka reiterated Japan’s intentions to remain true to its foreign policy, and expressed his appreciation for the kindness shown to him during his term of office. [626f]
162. Japan Retaliates Against the American Freezing Order.
The meeting of the Japanese Cabinet on July 27, 1941 decided upon retaliatory measures against the United States for freezing Japanese assets. Japan decided to draw up certain measures which would control foreign exchange and would entail all business activities of American citizens. However, if the United States were to act leniently in the future, Japanese authorities in Japan, Manchukuo, and China would be prepared to do likewise. [626g]
163. Ambassador Oshima Attempts to Change Japan’s Policy.
Ambassador Oshima had continued his efforts to persuade Japanese authorities to support Germany in the war against Russia and to cease their negotiations with the United States. On July 17, 1941 he reported the displeasure of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Chancellor Hitler with Japan’s recent activities, and urged that Japan make the Tripartite Pact the foundation of its national policy. [626h]
Two weeks later, on July 31, 1941, he again disagreed with Tokyo’s interpretation of Germany’s motives in attacking Russia by pointing out that Germany was planning only a short war in Russia before attacking England. Ambassador Oshima anticipated the collapse of Commissar Stalin’s government in the near future, and though admitting that America would enter the war, he minimized its ability to aid England. [626i]
[626c] II, 592.
[626d] II, 593-595.
[626e] II, 595.
[626f] II, 596-597.
[626g] II, 598.
[626h] II, 599.
[626i] II, 600.
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C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(f) Japanese-Russian Relations.
164. Rumor of Russia Withdrawing Its Troops from German Borders (May 1941).
Immediately following the Hess incident, relations between Moscow and Berlin began to show definite signs of strain, and Japan’s alliance with Germany and its Neutrality Pact with Russia placed it in a delicate position. Although Russia had been faithfully carrying out its economic agreements with Germany, it was noted in Berlin, as early as May 14, 1941, that Russia had withdrawn its troops from the German border, either in anticipation of war or with the purpose of avoiding it. Meanwhile, the German army continued its preparations, confident that it could easily conquer European Russia, if such were Chancellor Hitler’s plan. [627]
165. Russia Restricts the Transportation of War Materials.
In the economic agreement of September 1939, Russia had invited Germany to transport goods through Russia, but in May 1941 a problem concerning war materials arose. [628] Russia began restricting the shipment of machine tools and other war machinery for making arms, bombs and planes, and though Japan’s representatives commenced negotiations to have some of these restrictions relaxed, a negative response was expected. [629] Nor would Russia accept for transit goods assigned to countries with which it had not reached an agreement. To overcome this disadvantage, Tokyo ordered, in mid-May 1941 that freight which was to be shipped to Japan through either free or occupied territory was to be paid for in free German marks. [630]
Both Germany and Japan were disturbed because the worsening of German-Russian relations would eliminate the passage of import goods from Germany via Siberia. [631] Because of this the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on June 18, 1941 forwarded to Tokyo the German suggestion that Japan add to the terms of the recently contracted Japan-Russian trade pact certain provisions which would make possible the transfer of goods through Russian territory to and from other countries, including unoccupied countries. [632]
On the other hand, Tokyo was informed on June 17, 1941 that courier service could be reopened between Manchukuo and Europe, which indicated some relaxation of restrictions. [633]
166. Russia Seeks to Avoid War with Germany.
On May 15, 1941 Ambassador Tatekawa requested an explanation from Foreign Minister Molotov regarding the current rumors of war between Russia and Germany, and pointed out that, if such rumors were true, Japan would act only as mediator. Foreign Minister Molotov assured him that such talk was entirely without foundation and was designed only to discredit the Tripartite Pact. As a result of this interview, the Japanese Ambassador believed that Russia was attempting to avoid a clash with Germany, and that intensive Russian defense preparations along the western border were inconsequential in view of Russia’s desire to avert war.
[627] II, 601.
[628] II, 602.
[629] II, 603.
[630] II, 604-605.
[631] II, 606.
[632] II, 607.
[633] II, 608.
[634] II, 609.
130
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
According to a report of Ambassador Tatekawa on May 16, 1941 Germany had some 140 to 150 divisions concentrated on the western border with reinforcements close at hand, and Russia had but 116 divisions. [635] With this in mind, and considering the fact that Russian forces had long feared the German army, the Japanese Ambassador felt that there was no possibility of a clash because of Russian weakness.
Ambassador Tatekawa also pointed to the disadvantages of war for Germany, inasmuch as it was receiving the natural resources it needed from Russia. He believed that Germany could take the Ukraine, but that by fighting a defensive war Russia could nullify Germany’s temporary gains. For all of these reasons, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow stated that he did not see in the near future any chance of a major war developing between Germany and Russia. [636]
Vatican sources added strength to this belief in peace when they reported to Ambassador Horikiri that Russia had no alternative but to align itself with the Axis. [637]
Furthermore, though German intentions were not clear to Ambassador Oshima in Berlin, he felt that Russia would refrain from mobilization in the hopes of not giving Germany an excuse for an attack. However, he indicated his belief that Germany would defeat Russia in a short time, and that the United States and England would be of little assistance to Russia. [638]
167. European Observers Predict a German-Russian War.
Signs of a coming clash between Russia and Germany were perceived by some European observers, for on May 30, 1941 an eminent correspondent of the Catholic press confided to the Japanese Ambassador at Rome that German-Russian relations had reached “a pass of extreme tension”, and another well-informed newspaperman predicted that hostilities with Russia would start about June 15, 1941. Many observers believed that Germany would delay an attack against England and would immediately enter into hostilities against Russia, which was then expected to seek conciliation. [639]
War rumors were also prevalent in the Balkans where northbound German troops and supply cars were noticed. It was reported on June 3, 1941 that certain diplomatic circles in Sofia would welcome an outbreak of war because such a conflict would lead to the overthrow of the Communist Party. It appeared that Russian influence had been completely swept out of Yugoslavia, although Serb and Croatian sympathy for the Slavs was still as strong as ever. [640]
168. Japanese-Russian Trade Agreement (June 9, 1941).
Both Japan and Russia were striving to attain an equitable solution in regard to fishing and trade agreements, and Ambassador Tatekawa in Moscow urged, on May 15, 1941 that Japan act not later than August, 1941 on the question of North Sakhalin, an island owned jointly by Russia and Japan. [641]
Foreign Minister Matsuoka replied, on May 28, 1941, that he intended to settle definitely the question of rights and interests in North Sakhalin within the coming year. He asked that Russia have confidence in him, since in conducting the commerce and fishery negotiations satisfactorily he expected to encounter some domestic opposition.
[635] II, 610.
[636] II, 611.
[637] II, 612.
[638] II, 613.
[639] II, 614.
[640] II, 615.
[641] II, 616.
131
Although Japan had decided to maintain its usual defenses in the North Seas, it issued special instructions, on May 28, 1941, to its subjects forbidding trespassing or any acts of a troublesome nature within Russian waters. [642] Some contention arose over the scheduled departure on June 15, 1941 of the Kaiyo Maru for Sakhalin Island, but Tokyo decided to send it, regardless of the attitude of Russia. [643]
On May 31, 1941 Ambassador Tatekawa presented the respects of his Foreign Minister to Mr. Molotov, who, having already expressed his desire for an immediate completion of negotiations, urged the Japanese Ambassador to expedite matters in Tokyo. Thereupon Ambassador Tatekawa pointed out to Mr. Matsuoka that although the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact with Russia had been generally accepted in Japan, an early settlement of the fisheries dispute would effectively silence the remaining opposition by demonstrating Russian sincerity in the negotiations.
It was evident that Moscow blamed Mr. Matsuoka for the delay, since on May 15, 1941 Mr. Molotov had drawn up and delivered the Russian statement regarding the fisheries question, and, as of June 1, 1941 no answer had been received from Tokyo. [644]
According to Mr. Molotov, only one problem impeded the final settlement which Ambassador Tatekawa hoped for within a week after June 1, 1941. This was the Russian demand that the differential between land and sea shipping expenses be made up for by payment in kind of Japanese commodities. The Japanese Ambassador on June 1, 1941 offered his opinion, in which Mr. Molotov concurred, that some formula for mutual agreement on the matter could be reached. Having submitted a revised proposal to the Russian; the Japanese Ambassador stated that the entire business would be concluded with a week. [645] After much discussion of details to be included in the document, the agreement was finally reached on June 9, 1941. [646]
169. Japanese-Russian Agreement as to Boundary Lines (June 10, 1941).
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
In an effort to protect Japanese-Russian relations and to support the recently signed neutrality pact, a conference had been opened at Chita on May 27, 1941 to discuss the Manchurian-Russian boarder delineation. Even though the Japanese army was of the opinion that the whole matter should be kept absolutely secret, Japanese diplomats decided to make a public statement concerning the agreement finally reached on June 10, 1941, since it was believed that such an announcement would further the already improved relations between the two countries. [647] Though the preliminary work had been finished, the actual demarcation of the line remained to be done. It was hoped that this could be accomplished by the end of the summer of 1941. [648]
On the same day that Japan and Russia concluded their agreement, a report, sent to Tokyo and Moscow from Hsinking, Manchoukuo, declared that twenty-seven armored trains were transporting 800 trucks between Chita and Manchuli. Japanese diplomats traveling through Russia always made detailed reports of the military activities they had observed en route. [649]
[642] II, 617.
[643] II, 618.
[644] II, 619.
[645] II, 620-621.
[646] II, 622-624.
[647] II, 625-626.
[648] II, 627-628.
[649] II, 629.
132
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
It was pointed out that even for maneuvers, this was a large number of trucks, and in view of the international situation such activity deserved Japan’s close attention. [650]
Russia agreed to Tokyo’s request of June 16, 1941 that secrecy be observed regarding three diplomatic notes, which were to be known only to the Japanese Foreign Office and such officials as Russia approved. [651] Meanwhile, Japan was suspicious of Russia, and even on special occasions it insisted that Russian visitors be furnished with Japanese transportation. [652]
170. Russia Supplies Essential Materials to Germany.
From a commercial viewpoint, Russian-German relations in May and early June 1941 appeared unruffled for despite its overtaxed railroad facilities and recent loss of influence in the Balkans, [653] Russia continued to supply Germany with large quantities of materials even though, according to the Russian First Secretary at Rome no agreement regarding the joint exploitation of the Ukraine was in existence. [654] Furthermore, Tokyo was informed on June 5, 1941 that new contracts for raw materials between Russia and Italy were being considered, and that an Italian economic mission to Moscow was being organized. [655]
171. Germany’s Demands on Russia.
On June 6, 1941 Japanese representatives in Sofia and Moscow reported that the following demands were to be made of Russia by Germany:
(1) Return part of Bukovina to Rumania,
(2) Reconsider the Russian-German border line in Galicia,
(3) Allow Germany to enter the Ukraine, and
(4) Permit her passage through the Caucasus.
The fact that Germany had not referred to Bessarabia in her demands was interpreted by Japanese spokesman as something of a compromise. [656] Mr. Izumi, a Japanese representative in Sofia, stated that the acceptance of these demands would shatter the Russian army’s prestige, and he expected that the anti-Stalin wing would stage a coup d’etat. According to Mr. Izumi, it appeared that Russia was now forced to acquiesce or fight, and he believed that Russia was seriously menaced both from within and from without. Although there was still a possibility for peace, the German army was pressing Herr von Ribbentrop for a showdown, since it expected to defeat the Russian army in two or three weeks. [657] Some in diplomatic circles contended that Hitler was merely trying, at the risk of war, to bring Russia into the Tripartite Alliance. [658]
172. Japanese Diplomats Urge Russia to Accept German Demands.
Both Ambassador Tatekawa in Moscow on June 7, 1941 and Ambassador Horikiri in Rome on June 14, 1941 urged Mr. Matsuoka to intervene in bringing peace between Russia and Ger-
[650] II, 630.
[651] II, 631-632.
[652] II, 633.
[653] II, 610.
[654] II, 634.
[655] II, 635.
[656] II, 636.
[657] II, 637.
[658] II, 638.
133
many. The Foreign Minister was advised to press Russia to join the Axis, or to collaborate closely with anti-British and anti-American groups. Whatever the demands, Japan felt that Russia should accept in order to avoid war. [659]
Ambassador Tatekawa reported on June 7, 1941 that the German Ambassador in Moscow believed that Russia had acceded in the main to Germany’s requests, and that there was no reason for an attack. [660] But on June 17, 1941 the Japanese consul at Ankara was informed by a member of the German Embassy that unless Russia conformed to Chancellor Hitler’s demands within the next ten days, hostilities would begin. [661]
173. German Leaders Warn Japan of the Coming War.
On June 4, 1941 Ambassador Oshima reported the details of some important interviews he had just held with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Chancellor Hitler in which both German leaders had agreed that in all probability Germany could not avoid war with Russia. [662] Though the war was not yet a certainty and the date had not yet been set, Herr von Ribbentrop advised Japan to make its preparations for the event as soon as possible. According to the German leader, the campaign would be successfully finished in three months. [663]
Although there were many rumors to the effect that negotiations were under way between Russia and Germany, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had dismissed them as being absolutely groundless. Moreover, he declared that Germany had completed all its preparations and that troop concentrations were massed along its eastern border where Russian troops had also been stationed.
Ambassador Oshima asked Herr von Ribbentrop whether or not war with Russia could be avoided since Germany’s main objective was England. The German Foreign Minister replied that the attitude of the Soviet Union of late had become increasingly unfriendly toward Germany, and that there had even been an armed border clash between the two forces at the mouth of the Danube. According to the German Foreign Minister, it was evident that Russia was merely waiting for Germany to fail against England before declaring war itself.
Herr von Ribbentrop advised the Japanese Ambassador that the conquest of Russia at this time would give complete and undisputable control of the entire European continent to Germany, and would make it absolutely impossible for Great Britain and the United States to touch it. Moreover, such a conquest would split Russia to the great advantage of Japan. [664]
Ambassador Oshima advised Tokyo on June 6, 1941 to prevent the departure of Japanese citizens for Europe, via Siberia, because of the threatening situation, and a few days later the German Ambassador in Tokyo was ordered to keep Germans away from this route. [665]
174. Germany Denies Negotiating with Russia.
Despite the denials of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in his talks with Ambassador Oshima on June 3, 4, 1941 that Germany was negotiating with Russia, Tokyo, on June 14, 1941, ordered both Ambassador Horikiri in Rome and Ambassador Oshima in Berlin to inquire once again concerning this matter. [666]
[659] II, 639-640.
[660] II, 641.
[661] II, 642.
[662] II, 643-644.
[663] II, 646.
[664] II, Ibid.
[665] II, 647-648.
[666] II, 649-650.
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Mr. Matsuoka’s curiosity concerning a German-Russian rapprochement was again manifested on June 20, 1941, when he ordered Ambassador Oshima to discuss the gist of a reported conversation between the German Foreign Minister and the Russian Ambassador in Berlin. [667] Herr von Ribbentrop promptly denied that he had conversed with Ambassador Deganov, and reiterated that Germany had no intentions of negotiating with Russia. [668]
175. Prospects of an Anglo-Russian Oil Agreement.
Ambassador Cripps’ mission to Moscow, according to a report to Tokyo from the Japanese Ambassador in London on June 13, 1941, had not materially improved Anglo-Russian relations though England had already become aware of the inevitability of the Russo-German conflict. The Japanese Ambassador in London believed that as a consequence, an Asiatic-European rapprochement, at least on Anglo-Russian oil, would evolve. [669]
176. Ambassador Tatekawa in Moscow Doubts the Possibility of a German-Russian War. (June 16, 1941).
Italian and German Ambassadors in Moscow conferred on June 15, 1941 concerning the evacuation of their diplomatic staffs and families, and though the Japanese diplomats were informed that no official word had been received from either Berlin or Rome, arrangements for the departure of female staff members were concluded. As to the causes for this move, Mr. Tatekawa was informed that all departures were for family reasons. [670] The Japanese Ambassador was inclined to believe that the Axis diplomats had received no official instructions for he could discover no signs of their burning their codes or taking any other final precautions. [671]
The Japanese Ambassador to Moscow was still convinced on June 16, 1941 that Russia, although encouraged by England and the United States, knew full well that it had to maintain a cooperative attitude toward Germany. Ambassador Tatekawa blamed British Ambassador Cripps for an unfounded rumor of war between Russia and Germany, which had been denied by Tass, the official Russian news agency. [672]
However, Tokyo announced on June 17, 1941 that British and Russian denials of the threatening German-Russian rupture were made to minimize the situation, and should be considered as mere propaganda. Significantly, the Japanese government expected the beginning of the Russian war to be followed by a British-Russian alliance, an American-Russian rapprochement, and, finally, the entrance of the United States into the war. [673]
177. Ambassador Oshima Warns of the Imminence of the Russian-German War.
According to Ambassador Oshima, preparations had already been completed for the German surprise attack, and the Rumanian army had been completely mobilized on June 13, 1941. Chancellor Hitler had returned to Berlin on June 14, 1941 while Generals Brauchitsch and Halder as well as other military leaders had already gone to the front line. In view of these facts, Ambassador Oshima urgently requested instructions as to Japan’s policy towards the war. [674] http://Louis1J1Sheehan.us
[667] II, 651.
[668] II, 652.
[669] II, 653.
[670] II, 654-655.
[671] II, 656.
[672] II, 657.
[673] II, 658.
[674] II, 659.
135
On June 18, 1941 Ambassador Oshima reported that the clearing of the weather in Germany and the fact that Russia was fully aware of Germany’s intentions made the outbreak of war likely at any time. He emphasized the German army’s assurance of annihilating the Russian army in four weeks, and urged that Japan should be well prepared for the ending of the war in the near future. [675]
178. Japanese-Russian Financial Relations Remain Stable.
Japan continued to carry on normal financial relations with Russia, and, on June 20, 1941 after America’s freezing of German and Italian capital, it made preparations to transfer American money remittances directly from Tokyo to Moscow, rather than through Berlin. [676]
179. Japan Denies Its Friendly Relations with Russia Have Inconvenienced Germany.
Herr von Ribbentrop intimated on June 21, 1941 that Japan was responsible for Russia’s ability to move its Far Eastern forces to European Russia, whereupon Ambassador Oshima pointed out to the German Foreign Minister that it was only natural for Russia to concentrate its troops in its most vital possessions, and that Japanese-Russian relations had nothing to do with this move. [677]
180. Germany Attacks Russia (June 22, 1941).
Germany attacked Russia at 4 A.M., Moscow time, on June 22, 1941, just one hour before the German Ambassador to Moscow presented to Mr. Molotov a note he had received from Berlin on the previous evening.
Not all members of the German Foreign Staff whole-heartedly supported the attack, for the German Ambassador to Moscow, meeting with Ambassador Tatekawa, expressed his distinct disapproval. He had known since April 17, 1941 that Germany was going to attack Russia, and he believed that there was no reason for it to do so since Russia had not been deliberately obstructing Germany’s military action. He concluded that powerful military leaders must have been guiding Chancellor Hitler. [678]
After the outbreak of hostilities, the German Consul General met with Ambassador Ota at Vladivostok on the afternoon of June 22, 1941 and he explained that since the Comintern had been engaging for many months in activities within Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, as well as other countries coming under the jurisdiction of the Third Reich, and had also refused to withdraw its troops from the border (See Japanese-Russian Relations, Section 164), Russia had actually precipitated the final breach in German-Russian relations.
The Axis representative continued by saying that the war had been started by Germany, and that he saw no reason why Japan, for the present, should not maintain neutrality. The German diplomat’s request that German nationals be cared for in Japan and in Manchuria was granted, but when Mr. Ota offered to safeguard the documents of the departing diplomat, he learned that all German codes and important documents had been burned the night before. [679]
[675] II, 660.
[676] II, 661.
[677] II, 662.
[678] II, 663.
[679] II, 665.
136
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Reports on the first day’s fighting divulged that Russian troops along the border had not been completely mobilized. Five hundred Russian planes were reported shot down or destroyed on the ground, and a Russian air raid on Tilsit did little damage. Twenty-five Roumanian divisions under Marshal Antonescu and fifteen divisions under Marshal Karl Gustaf Mannerheim were assisting the Germans. According to Ambassador Oshima, the success of the day’s fighting contributed to the Axis’ great confidence in the ultimate outcome of the conflict. [680]
Although it was accepted that Germany would destroy the Ukraine and Caucasus, Ambassador Ota, talking with the U.S. Consul General in Vladivostok, learned that not all observers were agreed that Germany would pierce the heart of Russia. [681] Stating that he was convinced that President Roosevelt would announce America’s participation in the war and the extension of military assistance to Russia, the American representative expressed the hope that Japan, which was in a unique position, would move with caution. [682]
181. Japan Assures Germany of Its Support of the Axis.
On that same eventful day, June 22, 1941, Ambassador Ott called at the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo to show the text of the German note which had been delivered to Russia, and to announce that Hitler planned to “use every might and means to march against the U.S.S.R.” In response to an inquiry from Mr. Matsuoka, the German Ambassador admitted that there was no declaration of war against Russia in the note. Two days later June 24, 1941, it had been decided that no move in regard to the German-Russian war would be taken without full consultation with the German government. Japan again reiterated its desire to act entirely in accordance with the Tripartite Pact and stated that in regard to Poland, it would not quibble over details. [683]
It had been agreed that German officials in Moscow would be taken to Iran, and German interests would be placed in charge of the Bulgarian Minister. At Vladivostok, the German Consul General had severed all connections with the outside world on June 25, 1941, and arrangements were being made for him to embark on the Kasai Maru. [684]
Tokyo was informed on June 22, 1941 that Germany, simultaneously with its military attack on Russia, planned to establish a pro-German regime in Moscow, and also to set up separate governments in the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Baltic shore nations. Lithuania and Latvia would coalesce and Finland would be annexed to Estonia. [685]
182. Japan Investigates a German-British Rapprochement.
As battles raged on the Russian front in June, 1941 it was believed by some observers that the Russian army would retire to the Ural region to carry on a long war; the Germans, therefore, would seek an early termination of the war, and then would turn to the solution of the British question. There were rumors also that the future objective of the war would be changed and that a peace proposal would be submitted to Britain early in July, 1941. [686] In the light of the foregoing, some concern was felt by Tokyo concerning an unverified report that Foreign
[680] II, 666-667
[681] II, 668.
[682] II, Ibid.
[683] II, 663-669.
[684] II, 670.
[685] II, 671.
[686] II, 672, 673.
137
Minister von Ribbentrop had submitted an anti-Comintern proposal to the British Ambassador in Ankara. [687]
But Ambassador Oshima reported Chancellor Hitler’s statement of June 22, 1941, which declared that since Anglo-Russian cooperation had become very evident, a large German force would be sent to the eastern front. Following this statement, German papers emphasized that the Russian campaign was a prelude to the British campaign, and that the two campaigns were indivisible. [688]
183. Japan Gauges World Reaction to the Russo-German Conflict.
Japanese diplomats throughout the world were reporting the attitudes in regard to the Russo-German war of the countries to which they had been assigned. Close attention was paid to the views of England and the United States by all Japanese representatives. Japanese estimates of the public opinion in various countries of the world now follows:
(a) Great Britain.
According to a Japanese report, Prime Minister Churchill’s speech of June 22, 1941, in which he promised aid to Russia, was the occasion for the return of Ambassador Cripps to Moscow and the journey of General Sir Archibald Wavell to confer with Russian military forces.
Conferring with the Russian Ambassador in London, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden was reported to have urged Russia to wage a protracted war, for, according to the Japanese interpretation of Great Britain’s attitude, unless the war was long-drawn out, Russia would be forced to fight without British assistance. [689] Ambassador Oshima observed that Great Britain, convinced by past failures, which it had experienced “by interfering at the outset of the last several wars”, was merely extending verbal encouragement in the belief that it would be dangerous to ally itself with Russia too soon. [690]
(b) United States.
Japan also believed that the United States was following a policy of watchful waiting, and that in the event of a German victory it would not fulfill its promise to aid Russia. It seemed obvious to Japan, on July 4, 1941, that since Mr. Steinhardt, the American Ambassador who appeared to be anti-Russian, had not yet met with the British military mission in Moscow, and since only low-ranking officers were currently located at the American Embassy, no three-power military conference was likely to be under way at this time. [691]
Ambassador Tatekawa in Moscow was convinced that Ambassador Steinhardt was hopefully awaiting Russia’s downfall since the latter had asked the Japanese Ambassador to question Foreign Minister Molotov concerning the methods of evacuating foreign diplomatic officials from Moscow. Having been asked to defer this question lest he should insult the Russian government, Mr. Steinhardt removed all his diplomatic personnel to distant villas. [692]
In the light of the growing Russian-American solidarity, the Japanese Ambassador in Rome suggested on August 5, 1941 that Japan act immediately to settle its Russian border question. Fearing the task of facing the combined Russian and American forces, he thought it timely for
[687] II, 674.
[688] II, Ibid.
[689] II, 675.
[690] II, 676-677.
[691] II, 678.
[692] II, Ibid.
138
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Japan to use its occupation of French Indo-China merely as a threat against England and the United States, and at the same time to prepare quickly to attack northward. [693]
(c) Spain.
From Spain came General Franco’s request that Spanish volunteers be allowed to assist Germany in its crusade against Communism. Although little military value could be seen in such an alliance, Axis leaders were aware of its importance as material for propaganda in South America. [694]
(d) Sweden.
Internal dissension obscured Swedish foreign policy, but German sources believed that the anti-Russian faction in Sweden was gradually winning more strength than the anti-German group. [695]
(e) Finland.
Ambassador Oshima was informed that Finland’s declaration of neutrality was intended to camouflage a lack of preparedness, and that finally, when sufficiently armed, it would launch an attack on its former enemy, Russia. [696] Finnish defenses had been improved during the preceding year, and the eastern border was observed to be firmly guarded. Although no emergency mobilization had been ordered, it was reported that 10,000 men had been called to arms on June 15, 1941. Women’s relief detachments had been formed, antiaircraft posts manned, and members of the Young Men’s Associations had joined the German forces. [697] On June 26, 1941 Finland entered the war.
(f) Manchukuo.
Repercussions of the Russo-German conflict were watched with special care within Japanese-controlled Manchukuo because of its difficult border problems and internal differences. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities on Russia’s western front, Russian troops along the eastern Manchurian border were observed engaging in athletics. However, Japanese observers, not misled by this pretense, perceived efficient Russian defense preparations going on in the background. [698]
On June 24, 1941 Russia seemed to be refraining from any provocation within Manchukuo, but Japan believed that Russian espionage agents were working with an already established underground organization. The populace seemed to be calm, but some Japanese sympathizers advocated an immediate thrust at Russia. A few White Russians also manifested a desire to rid eastern Asia of Soviet Russian influence. On the other hand, some Japanese were known to be apprehensive lest Manchukuo become involved in the conflict, though the natives expressed no opinion. [699]
The possibility that the Chinese Communist army might move to Outer Mongolia on the pretext that China must defend both Russia and Outer Mongolia was considered by Japan. On June 25, 1941 the Russian army was increasing its supply of armor and armament and mobilizing on the Manchurian border for any emergency. [700]
[693] II, 679-681.
[694] II, 676.
[695] II, Ibid.
[696] II, 677.
[697] II, 682.
[698] II, 683.
[699] II, Ibid.
[700] II, 684.
139
In an effort to prevent the U.S.S.R. from suspecting Japan’s hostile attitude, the Japanese Kwantung army maintained an appearance of reserve. Officially, Manchukuo adhered to a policy of friendliness, although many young officers of the Kwantung army favored an offensive to settle the Russian question once and for all. Meanwhile, negotiations were being carried on between the Manchukuo Bureau of General Affairs and Japan regarding the supply of materials in case of a Japanese‑Russian war. [701]
On June 30, 1941 Japanese agents at Hsinking disclosed that the Russian army had intensified its scouting along the Russian‑Manchukuoan border, for pursuit planes, replacing bombers, were concentrated in the first lines. This move was believed to indicate that temporary defense preparations had been replaced by permanent fortifications, and that Russia was in readiness for immediate action. [702]
Continual cruising by Russian planes over the Manchukuoan border evoked the disapproval of Japanese authorities, who in early July, 1941 complained to the Russian Consul General in Harbin, whereupon reciprocal charges against the Japanese were received. [703] The Kwantung army had become quite active in northern Manchuria but Japan believed that a tremendous number of troops would be required to occupy the region east of Lake Baikal, and this would occasion many difficulties in governing the region. In addition, should a Japanese invasion be successful, communications would become a major problem. [704]
Tokyo was informed on July 1, 1941 that in Manchuria the working classes were concerning themselves principally with crop conditions, but they feared a Russian attack on Japan. Japanese agents further discerned that Russian nationals in Manchuria, especially young men subject to military service, were apprehensive about the prospective war. In addition some Jews in Manchukuo who appeared to be anti‑German, feared that Japan’s entry into the war would affect them commercially. [705]
In view of the fact that espionage activities of other nations might flourish within Manchukuo, on July 4, 1941 Japanese authorities prepared to restrict the entrance, passage, and residence therein of members of any other nations, especially the United States and England. To carry out this policy, Kwantung authorities were urged to participate in a passport control conference. [706]
It was suggested, on July 4, 1941 that Japanese Foreign Office officials, who from long experience had become well acquainted with Russian affairs, should be assigned to positions in Manchukuo to maintain liaison with the Japanese intelligence organizations in Harbin, Hilar, Botanko, Taoan, and Hei‑ho. [707]
On July 10‑11, 1941 newly assigned Japanese consuls conferred about world conditions as affected by the German‑Russian war, the ability of the Soviet Union to resist Germany, and violences perpetrated by the Comintern against Manchukuo. Russian strategy and the general trend of the Manchukuoan population were also discussed, and opinions were exchanged on matter of espionage and counter‑espionage. Staff Officer Kotani, reporting on the relative quality of Russian forces, stated that both officers and men were of fairly high caliber, particularly in the air and tank forces. He revealed that they exhibited considerable tactical knowledge and ability, and were quite patriotic.
[701] II, 685.
[702] II, 686
[703] II, 687.
[704] II, 688.
[705] II, 689.
[706] II, 690.
[707] II, 691.
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In the event of a war between Russia and Japan, Japan expected that Russia would:
a. Promote riots and strikes in factories;
b. Incite disorganization in the Manchukuoan army;
c. Promote disunity through anti‑Japanese and communistic elements;
d. Instigate activities among the banditry;
e. Engage in destruction and gunfire;
f. Spread disease germs;
g. Throw credit into chaos. [708]
Another important point under discussion was the increasing weakness of Japanese leadership among the people of Manchukuo, for which a Japanese spokesman blamed the non-materialization of various plans and conflicting economic policies. [709]
(g) China.
From Shanghai came the announcement that both Soviet and White Russians had enthusiastically united for the defense of their homeland. [710] At the outbreak of German‑Russian hostilities, the Nanking government under Japanese direction, voiced its opinion that emphasis should now be placed on peace for China, since it was evident that the Chungking government could no longer depend on aid from Russia. [711] On July 1, 1941 Chinese authorities were reported as speculating concerning the attitude of the Chungking government toward the Chinese Communist Party. It was believed that a comprehensive settlement of the Japanese-Chinese incident resulting from a victory for Germany would eliminate all future anxieties of Japan.
With respect to Russian strength, the Chinese officials discussed whether or not Commissar Stalin would realize, before his complete annihilation, the inevitability of Russia’s defeat and would consider a compromise. They pointed out that this would agree with Germany’s position, since it was believed that Hitler had no intention of annihilating Russia. In view of the possibility of an early conclusion of the German‑Russian war, they felt that it was unwise for Japan and China to rupture existing relations with Russia. [712]
Though there were some Chungking authorities who seemed to advocate the coalition of Chungking with Great Britain and the United States, Japanese agents reported that a great majority were of the opinion that no definite steps should be taken until a favorable situation had been reached in world affairs. With this policy in mind, Chungking authorities guided public opinion by restricting all newspapers from favoring too much either Germany or Russia. [713]
Various foreign representatives were extremely active in Chungking on July 1, 1941, especially the Russian Ambassador who proposed a Chungking‑Russian alliance. In reply, China’s Foreign Minister stated that no objection to concluding the alliance existed, but inasmuch as Great Britain and America desired to cooperate with Russia in the European war, it was important that China await future developments. In addition, China was aware of the possibility that Russia would collapse in the near future, thus putting an end to all future aid; therefore, it was felt, in accord with the existing sentiment, that these factors should be taken into consideration, if a treaty were to be made between Chungking and Moscow. [714]
[708] II, 692.
[709] II, Ibid.
[710] II, 693.
[711] II, 694.
[712] II, 695.
[713] II, 696.
[714] II, Ibid.
141
It was noted by the Japanese that since the commencement of Russo‑German hostility, Generalissimo Chiang Kai‑shek had softened his demands on the Chinese Communist army, and had been taking the attitude that it would be sufficient if the army merely refrained from revolt against Chungking. In further dealings with the Communist organization, he apparently had promised to consider General Chou En‑Lai’s demand for remunerations covering the months of May and June 1941, a demand based on the fact that General Chou En‑Lai’s army had strictly observed orders from Chungking and had participated in open warfare against Japan. [715] On August 4, 1941 Japanese intelligence agents were ordered by Tokyo to discover whether or not Russians in Shanghai were transshipping East Indian rubber to Vladivostok, and were purchasing petroleum from American and British firms for delivery to Vladivostok. [716]
(h) Turkey.
By signing a non‑aggression pact with Germany on June 25, 1941 Turkey sought further to guarantee its neutrality in the German‑Russian war, which it had announced on June 23, 1941. It was generally believed at this time that after defeating Russia, Germany would move southward from the Caucasus through Iraq and Syria to attack Egypt. [717] On the other hand, Turkey’s increasing of her border troops to five divisions indicated to another observer that it intended to avoid war at all cost. It had also sealed the future of Syria by prohibiting the passage of French arms. [718]
On July 12, 1941, however, Japan believed that Turkey, despite its neutral policy at the outbreak of German‑Russo hostilities, had begun to manifest through the press its long harbored resentment against Russia. [719] Two weeks later, on July 29, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in Ankara reported that after occupying the Caucasus, Germany, disregarding its recent pact, would march through Turkey to attack Iraq. War would break out in the Near East by autumn, as Japan saw it, for Turkey had no alternative but to refuse both belligerents or decide to which she would yield. In either case the unavoidable result would be war. The Japanese Ambassador in Ankara was much impressed with German might, and predicted that Germany would soon crush the Turks. [720]
(i) Hungary.
Hungary declared war on June 27, 1941 and now most of the countries of Europe were embroiled in the war. [721] According to Ambassador Oshima, this tremendous spreading of the war was contrary to the wishes of Germany since Chancellor Hitler’s motive was not to destroy world culture, but to save it from Bolshevism. [722] Stressing the necessity of Japan’s redoubling its efforts in promoting an Axis victory, Ambassador Oshima pointed out that his country had undertaken such an obligation in signing the anti‑Comintern pact. [723]
(j) India.
Since Japan was cognizant of the role that India might play in the overthrow of English influence in the Far East, it supported the activities of certain Indian revolutionaries. Fearing
[715] II, Ibid.
[716] II, 697.
[717] II, 698‑699.
[718] II, 575.
[719] II, 700.
[720] II, 701‑702.
[721] II, 703‑704.
[722] II, 703‑705.
[723] II, 703.
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
that America would endeavor to stimulate liberalism in India, and that Great Britain would attempt to compromise with the Indian Congress, one of these leaders in Berlin, presumably Mr. Bose, sent a message to his colleagues in India via the Japanese diplomatic communication system. It requested some indication of Indian reaction to the Russo‑German war, and urged that any compromise between Great Britain and the Indian Congress be sabotaged.
According to the opinion of this leader, India’s only hope for independence lay in an Axis victory. Believing that Germany’s victory over Russia was just a matter of weeks, he predicted that Chancellor Hitler would make some pronouncement immediately about India’s independence, and suggested that this pronouncement be followed by a revolution. Arrangements were to be made immediately in order to take over rule of India at the proper time, and reliable agents, unknown to the British, were to be sent to work in certain localities. India should approve the current Japanese policy in the Far East, including Indo-China, since it conformed to the objective of Indian nationalists. [724]
184. Japan Is Warned of Soviet Strength.
Although first reports from the Russian front pointed to an early German victory, some keen analysts credited Russia with a reserve power suspected by few foreign governments. Despite the fact that many besides Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima urged Mr. Matsuoka to declare war against Russia, others, including the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy in Hsinking, formerly attached to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, advised that Russia, possessing rich resources in territory, manpower, and material, and after twenty-four years of communistic education, completely unified behind Stalin, should not be underestimated.
The former Moscow staff member also pointed to the fact that within the next few months a severe Russian winter would hamper a German advance. Russia’s powerful defense line along the Manchukuo border also served as a sign of reserve strength. [725]
185. Russia Seeks Japan’s Support of the Neutrality Pact.
From the beginning of hostilities, Russia’s Ambassador to Tokyo attempted to cement Russo‑Japanese relations, and tried to determine Japan’s feelings with regard to its neutrality agreement with Russia. On June 23, 1941 Ambassador Smetanin called on Foreign Minister Matsuoka to determine whether or not Japan intended to honor the Neutrality Pact. Foreign Minister Matsuoka replied that the Neutrality Pact with Russia had no relation to the Tripartite Pact, and that the Japanese government was still undetermined regarding its attitude on the present turn of events. However, in discussing Japan’s foreign policy with Stalin at a time when he had not anticipated a Russo‑German war, Foreign Minister Matsuoka had stated that Japan would not collaborate with Britain and America.
Declaring that if he had suspected the coming of war between Germany and Russia, he would not have hesitated to have undertaken the role of mediator, Mr. Matsuoka asked Ambassador Smetanin why Japan was not given such an opportunity. The Russian representative replied that since the terms of the Russo‑German agreement had been carried out wholeheartedly by Russia, Germany could find no cause for complaint, and, therefore, it had attacked suddenly without forewarning or a declaration of war.
[724] II, 706
[725] II, 707.
143
To Mr. Matsuoka’s inquiry concerning the connection between the unexpected return of Ambassador Cripps to England and Prime Minister Churchill’s promise to aid to Russia, Ambassador Smetanin answered that many ambassadors returned home for rest after an extended term of service. The Japanese Foreign Minister again stressed that Japan had thrown in its lot with Germany and Italy; but that since he had always worked for the improvement of relations between Russia and Japan, he felt that an outbreak of hostilities between the two countries would be most unfortunate. Ambassador Smetanin replied that both he and the British Ambassador had also been working directly for the improvement of Russo‑Japanese relations, and that he hoped Mr. Matsuoka’s government would take an objective view of the situation. [726]
From Vichy came word that the Russian Ambassador resident there had also sought, on June 25, 1941 to determine the Japanese attitude toward the German‑Russian war. The Japanese Ambassador replied that, having received no instructions from Tokyo, he could not very well express an official opinion, but he knew that Japan would consider all conditions very carefully in the light of the Tripartite and Neutrality Pacts. Emphasizing the fact that Russia had been strictly observing the Russo‑German treaty when Germany attacked suddenly, without provocation, the Russian Ambassador expressed the wish that Japan and Russia would maintain friendly relations. [727]
In Tokyo on June 24, 1941 Foreign Minister Matsuoka told the Italian Ambassador, who had called on him, that as yet no policy had been determined with regard to Japan’s entrance into the war. He again stressed the fact that neither the Tripartite Pact nor the Neutrality Pact had a direct bearing on each other, and that the Tripartite Pact was still a pivot for Japanese foreign relations. [728]
Although Japan had made no decision as to its action, Japanese Consul Ota in Vladivostok divulged, on June 26, 1941, that preparations had been made to burn his codes, machines, and special telegrams if an emergency occurred. [729]
According to a Japanese report of June 27, 1941 Foreign Minister Molotov, who believed that Japan had possessed previous knowledge of the German attack, was reminded by Ambassador Tatekawa that Mr. Matsuoka had denied the widespread war rumors during the latter part of May, and that the Japanese government, even if it had received some unofficial warning, was not aware of Germany’s decision to attack until a few days before hostilities began. As proof he related that two Japanese officials had left Tokyo for Germany on June 20, 1941 and two others had been dispatched to Iran on June 21, 1941; therefore, it was even conceivable that Japan had no advance information at all regarding the German plan.
Mr. Molotov commented that since there was nothing in the Tripartite Pact regarding Soviet Russia, Japan was not obligated to oppose Russia. Since the two governments were neighbors, he hoped that the recently improved relations between them could be maintained in the future. Expressing a similar desire that nothing should be done to upset their friendly relations, Ambassador Tatekawa indicated that Japan expected Russia to refrain henceforth from agitating the laboring classes, and he suggested that the issuance of entrance visas to Russia be expedited. Mr. Molotov denied emphatically the existence of a pre‑war British‑Russian alliance, but admitted that arrangements were made for such a treaty after the outbreak of war. [730]
[726] II, 708.
[727] II, 709.
[728] II, 710.
[729] II, 711.
[730] II, 712.
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186. Ambassador Tatekawa Urges Support of Neutrality Pact.
Ambassador Tatekawa, expressing his views on June 27, 1941 with regard to Japan’s imminent decision, stated that he realized the difficulty of the situation for the Foreign Office since Japan was divided in opinion. Despite the fact that some gesture of support for the Tripartite Pact should be made, he believed that since Japan in all probability would not be capable of offering Germany complete military cooperation, it would be well to maintain the status quo and to exert every effort to conclude the China affair. Though Ambassador Tatekawa was aware of the current German victories, he stated that there were no guarantees against some radical change in the war situation. [731]
187. Germany Seeks Active Support for the Tripartite Pact.
As the Russian war progressed, German authorities pressed for Japan’s aid, but Foreign Minister Matsuoka reminded Ambassador Oshima in Berlin that at the time of his visit to Germany, Herr von Ribbentrop had said nothing about seeking Japan’s help. Since Herr von Ribbentrop seemed to be puzzled because Japan was not making necessary preparations to take part in the war, Mr. Matsuoka explained to Ambassador Ott, on June 27, 1941, that he had assumed that Germany was not anxious to have Japan join in the war against Russia. [732]
188. Japanese Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin Urge Support of Germany.
The Japanese Ambassador in Rome declared, on June 30, 1941, that if the present Cabinet adopted an anti‑Russian policy, the world would receive the impression that Japan was an opportunistic country. Therefore, he urged the adoption of some intermediate step to precede any military action against Russia. [733]
The Japanese Ambassador in Rome also urged Japan to assist in eradicating the power of Russia, the great root of all evil, and pointed out that Japan, for its own self‑interest, needed to prevent other powers from using Asiatic Russia as a base for anti‑Axis assistance. He believed that a clear statement of policy would strengthen the morale of Japan’s people at home, and would contribute to an adjustment of military relations with the Axis. This would make it easier for other nations to understand Japan’s position. [734]
Ambassador Oshima continued to favor Japan’s entrance into the war on the side of the Axis. Pointing out on June 28, 1941, that Japan’s indecision, as reflected in the many conferences being held in Tokyo and reported in the European press, affected the honor and integrity of his country, the pro‑Axis Ambassador urged Foreign Minister Matsuoka to disregard further arguments and to come to an immediate decision. [735] The Japanese Ambassador to Turkey also supported the views of his colleagues in Berlin and in Rome that Japan should take advantage of the splendid opportunity to settle its problems with Russia rather than desist because of American and English pressure. [736]
Foreign Minister Matsuoka responded, on June 28, 1941, to Ambassador Oshima’s repeated requests for instructions concerning Japan’s attitude towards the war by advising him to be patient until a final decision was reached. Promising to send instructions in a few days, he
[731] II, 713.
[732] II, 714.
[733] II, 715.
[734] II, 716.
[735] II, 717.
[736] II, 718.
145
indicated that there was no unanimity in government opinion. [737] After this, Ambassador Oshima apparently felt that there was no other alternative but to wait for instructions, but he was hopeful that the Japanese government would persuade its people to join the anti‑Russian war. [738]
189. Japan Decides Against Intervention in German‑Russian War.
On July 2, 1941 the Japanese Diet in the presence of the Emperor reached its decision, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka informed Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop that, although Japan would not fail to act in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact, it was imperative that it not relax its efforts in the south at this time; thus, it would be contrary to Japan’s best interests to break off relations with Russia. However, as a vital contribution to the common cause of the Axis, Japan would secure bases in French Indo-China to strengthen its pressure upon Great Britain and the United States. [739] Japan’s policy was summed up by Foreign Minister Matsuoka as follows:
1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to the world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change.
2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self‑existence and self-protection. [740]
Mr. Matsuoka had conveyed the Cabinet’s decision to Ambassador Smetanin on July 1, 1941. At that time both agreed to issue written statements to the effect that friendly Japanese-Russian relations must be preserved at all costs. Stating that the Japanese government wished to extend its good offices to both Germany and Russia, Mr. Matsuoka expressed his wish that in the light of the complexity of the situation and Japan’s difficult position, Russia would exercise due caution. [741]
Foreign Minister Matsuoka also sent an oral statement to Foreign Minister Molotov in which he expressed Japan’s hope for a speedy termination of hostilities between Germany and Russia, or at least that they not be extended to the Far East where Japan had many vital interests. [742]
That Germany was displeased with Japan’s decision can not be doubted for Herr von Ribbentrop, aware of the division of opinion in the Japanese government, had sent an urgent message to Tokyo, through Ambassador Oshima, which had arrived too late to change the course of events. [743] This displeasure was reflected in the actions of Ambassador Oshima, a strong supporter of the Axis, who on the following day, July 3, 1941, requested that he be called back to Tokyo because of illness. [744] It was also evident that disagreement with the final decision existed in the Japanese Foreign Office itself. [745]
Foreign Minister Matsuoka sympathized with Ambassador Oshima in regard to his physical condition, but, on July 5, 1941, he insisted that the Japanese Ambassador to Germany should sacrifice personal desire for the good of his country by remaining in Berlin. Assuring his
[737] II, 719.
[738] II, 720.
[739] II, 721‑727.
[740] II, 727.
[741] II, 728‑729.
[742] II, 723‑724.
[743] II, 721‑722.
[744] II, 730.
[745] II, 731.
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representative in Germany that the German, Italian, and Russian Ambassadors had received oral statements in explanation of Japan’s position, Mr. Matsuoka felt confident that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop would fully understand. [746]
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
