No. 243
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
FROM: Havana (Nanjo) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo
(Strictly secret)
Between the 16th and the 24th of July, the following American warships were anchored in the naval harbor of Guantanamo:
2 battleships; 4 light cruisers; 4 destroyers; 2 Coast Guard cutters; 2(long range ?) heavy bombing planes.
Trans. 10-13-41
No. 244
FROM: Manila (Nihro) June 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 315.
Concerning the cargo ship referred to in the last part of my secret letter # 467 [a], we have in the meantime had no reports; however, one of my spies informs me that facts concerning the ship in question are very vague. However, the transport “Washington”, after docking here on May 8th, went immediately to the port of Olongapo and disembarked troops of an uncertain number who are ostensibly to keep watch over Subic Bay [b].
The eight destroyers and four submarines anchored here left port on the 2nd.
[a] Not available.
[b] In Philippine Islands.
Trans. 6-6-41
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 245
FROM: Manila (Nihro) June 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo ( Gaimudaijin) # 326 (?).
Ships in port on the 7th:
(1) MANILA:
TON
MATTO
BUKKU
8 destroyers
PASU
14 Submarines
BECK
HON
2 target towing ships
2 supply ships
—–
—–
Transport Henderson left the 5th, destination uncertain.
(2) CAVITE:
None.
The REI left port, date and destination uncertain.
Trans. 6-12-41
No. 246
FROM: Manila (Nihro) June 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 335.
Re my # 326 [a].
It has been ascertained that the two supply ships were mine layers.
On the 9th, two more ships of the same class entered port. They were both direct from America.
On the 11th, an oiler, TURITEI, entered port.
[a] See II, 245. Lists ships in Manila and Cavite.
Trans. 6-17-41
No. 247
FROM: Tokyo June 21, 1941
TO: China Net Circular # 1289.
Action Manila as # 176.
According to a Tokyo Nichi-Nichi dispatch from your place on the 17th, an officer of the American aviation force, a Major KONROO, together with 10 others, arrived there by clipper
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on the 16th, and left the following day for Chungking via Hongkong. Please wire as to the actual circumstances.
Trans. 6-24-41
No. 248
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 1, 1941
TO: Manila (Riyoji) # 191.
According to a reliable source of information the United States Navy in your territory is desirous of requisitioning half of the American Consulate office space in the Tourist Bureau Building until September Ist, for vigilance and anti-espionage work.
The above may be a part of the plan to establish a special service organ for the British-American-Chinese military liaison chain. Therefore, please verify the above report and watch the conduct of the Navy personnel and reply information.
As the source of this information is strictly secret, please exercise caution in making investigations.http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US
Trans. 7-5-41
No. 249
FROM: Manila (Nihro) June 28, 1941
TO: Washington # 51.
Re my # 343 [a] to the Minister.
At present, not only are there a great many questions pending, but there are also numerous persons who, for the sake of convenience, entered the country as temporary tourists, and whose period of sojourn in the country is about up. Since I think their representations, as indicated in my caption message, are probably not more than a matter of mere formality, I would like to have you bear in mind, in addition to this, the considerations for an immediate settlement of this matter now. Please wire results. I have transmitted this to the Minister .
[a] Not available.
Trans. (Not dated)
No. 250
FROM: Davao July 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 86.
Secondary intelligence.
According to a spy, it seems, in view of the rapid turnover of Americans having charge of stevedores who are being used in customs duty, as well as by us here for observation of American submarines entering port, that investigation and collection of intelligence regarding Japanese vessels and Japanese persons in this area is being carried out by
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
British and American authorities —– —– —– —– —– —– —– —– —– —–. On the whole, it seems that this is being done through the British Honorary Consul BROWN (Ker Company). This man is understood to pass information along to the M–gda Hongkong continually.
Passed by cipher letter to Manila.
Trans. 10-11-41
No. 251
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
FROM: Manila July 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 399.
Re your Circular # 1408 [a].
According to a check up at the Immigration Bureau, there were 1013 (some of whom are reentry) Chinese immigrants who arrived during the month of June. This is a tremendous increase over the past monthly average of 250 persons. The greater portion of the above immigrants appear to have been summoned by those already residing here and they do not appear to be contract laborers, referred to in your message. (I am checking up on the sex, age, etc., of these summoned immigrants.)
According to our informer, these immigrants have nothing to do with military construction projects and their migration is thought to be due to our policy in China. However, I will make further investigation.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 7-19-41
No. 252
FROM: Tokyo July 5, 1941
TO: Manila # 203.
Re my message # 160 [a].
In view of the changed conditions after that message, please wire your opinion regarding sending Negishi to look into the present tenant farm conditions.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 7-14-41
No. 253
FROM: Manila July 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 390.
Re your # 203 [a].
It is quite true that under present conditions it is exceedingly difficult to conduct cultural propaganda. However, Negishi has many friends among persons in newspaper circles in
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this area. We would like to have him make contacts with various persons in the area as an individual, and through such contacts engage in gathering intelligence.
(The Japanese people of this area have become very fearful of being looked upon with suspicious eyes by U.S. officials of late. For this reason, they become very evasive and defensive when I or any of my staff try to get in touch with them. You are aware of this state of affairs and of the consequent difficulty we are encountering in collecting intelligence data..)
At the same time, we would like to have Negishi do some solid ground work for the opening of the Cultural Hall which, according to plans, is to take place shortly.
For the above reasons, will you please send him here as previously planned. It is an absolute certainty that upon his arrival in Manila, he will be bombarded with questions concerning the international situation as seen from Japanese standpoint as well as on various domestic issues. Please, therefore, have him well versed on all the answers before he departs from Japan.
[a] See II, 252.
Trans. 7-14-41
No. 254
FROM: Manila July 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 401.
BARYOTTO [a] and JOSE LEIDO have both come to this office requesting financial assistance for the purpose of running in the general election for the districts of Aatwn [a] and Mindoro respectively. In addition, OPUSU [a], whom we are now using in our schemes within the Assembly, too, has come to us asking that we (contribute toward?) the campaign fund of his followers. With regard to the possibilities of their Domination as candidates to the offices held by retiring members of the Assembly, we are continuing our secret investigations in regard to these three men, but since there is also the matter of our replying to their requests, after you have perused this, I would like to have you wire me for my own personal information whether it is possible for us to make those apportionments.
1. The necessary amount of OPUSU’s use is 15,000 yen. BARYOTTO and LEIDO together require 25,000 yen, making a grand total of 40,000 yen. This disbursement should be made by the end of July when the Nationalist Party is scheduled to open its Convention here for the purpose of deciding its candidates. Therefore, I would like to have you let me know by then what the possibilities are.
2. With regard to the request made by OPUSU, I would like to have you comply with it from the point of view of increasing his party affiliations and establishing his influence in the Assembly.
3. Now, BARYOTTO, as you know, is an intimate friend of PAREDESU [a] who is the publisher of a Sulu native-language newspaper which we subsidize and which professes Pan-Asiaism (the paper is strongly supported by some of the up-holders of Pan-Asiaism). Though he ran for Governor last year, he failed to be elected. It seems that PAREDESU has privately promised to do his best in order to help him win the election.
LEIDO now holds the office of the Chief of the Income Tax Bureau in the Treasury Department. ARASU [a], former Secretary of the Treasury, and RUNK [a], a former member of the Assembly from the district of Mindoro, strongly support him.
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Though there is a possibility of these two men being elected, because of the confused situation within the local convention, it is extremely hard to predict whether their chances of winning the election are good or bad. However, both of these men are simple fellows and are said to be men of dependable character .
4. No direct aid has been requested by RAWURERU [a], our legal advisor, who is running as a candidate from BATANGASU [a] (he is the son of RAWURERU, Judge of the Supreme Court); by MAGARONA [a], at present member of the Assembly and Chairman of the Labor Immigration Commission-a man connected with this office; and by BAMENTA [a], now a member of the Assembly. Should events necessitate, I believe we should assist them at this time. We are continuing our private investigation with regard to the above-mentioned BARYOTTO and LEIDO’s supporters. Now, should we feel that their chances of nomination as candidates are slim, then I think that it would be appropriate for us to delay aid at such a time. Therefore, please arrange to transfer the sums of money requested above before that time.
[a] Kana spelling.
Trans. 8-13-41
No. 256
FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 396.
1. The United States ship, American Leader (10,000 ton class) entered port today and unloaded what appeared to be ten some odd coast guns (length about 18 feet), also ten some odd gun platforms of what appeared to be such and twenty some odd light tanks.
2. The Trinity (?) left port yesterday; destination unknown.
Trans. (Not dated)
No. 257
FROM: Manila July 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 398.
The requisitioned ship, President Taft, arrived in harbor on the 10th, with from 800 to 1000 soldiers on board for the Philippines. All vessels in port put to sea for about three weeks on the 17th, it is rumored. This will be investigated further.
Trans. 7-18-41
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No. 258
FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 474.
1. Anchored warships-Dfionomi [a] .
2. There is (are) anchored Danish ship(s) —– garbled —– after loading at Webu [a] (Ebu ?) will leave for America. In addition two ships touched port on the 1st and 2nd from Orongabo [a].http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US
3. Harrison and Coolidge entered port on the 31st and Ist respectively.
[a] Kana spelling.
Trans. 8-5-41
No. 259
FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 433.
The United States is making a concentrated effort to strengthen Philippine defenses. There are at present 460 planes, and about 1300 pilots. Army force numbers 10,000 and an effort is being made to increase this number. The Philippine Army numbers about 130,000 including those on active duty, reserve lists and the gendarmerie. In an emergency, about 100,000 men could be turned over to U.S. officers to command, it is estimated by the bureau concerned.
Trans. 8-1-41
No. 260
FROM: Manila July 31, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 465.
There are differences between my telegram # 4?8 (?), paragraph (2), and my report # 75 on the number of Philippine Army aeroplanes to be included in the American Army.
However, the first figures were taken from a newspaper without further verification. At present we are making investigations relative to the number of aeroplanes and aviation officers and men.
Trans. 8-14-41
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 261
FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 476.
Re your # 245 [a].
In observing planes on practice flights, I notice that the color of military and naval planes has not been changed and that they are not camouflaged. However, I have heard that among the naval planes there are those which have been observed to be painted a light green. Though I am making additional secret investigations, that is all for the time being.
Furthermore, in recent times, the number of planes flying above the city has decreased considerably.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 8‑7‑41
No. 262
FROM: Manila (Nihro) August 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 480.
Intelligence of primary order.
1. Two destroyers sailed on the fourth. All the war ships at anchor have sailed. There are, however, several small destroyers in the neighborhood of Corregidor [a]. (This was observed by the crews of the Koden Maru and the Kaischu Maru.)
2. About six‑hundred American soldiers have arrived in Manila on the Coolidge. (This was learned from the crew of the Coolidge.)
[a] An island in Cavite Province at the entrance of Manila Bay.
Trans. 8‑7‑41
No. 263
FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 407.
On the morning of the 13th, the master electric dynamo was struck by lightning and put out of commission, and electricity is being supplied by an auxiliary system, however, consumption of electricity is to be curtailed in every way, it was announced in the newspapers. Repairs will take about three weeks. This is having a grave effect in the U.S. Navy and military preparations at Cavite.
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No. 264
FROM: Manila (Nihro) July 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 422.
Very Secret. For Official Code Handling.
As there is serious likelihood of orders being enforced for freezing of assets and for strict investigation of all funds connected with foreigners, we have decided to keep the larger part of this office’s funds in cash, but when this is used up it will be difficult to secure remittances of secret funds for this office, and if the situation becomes serious, there is danger that much trouble may be incurred. Therefore, after conferring with branch manager Yamamoto of the Specie Bank, we have decided to be ready against such time by some such arrangement as described in the last part of his message to the Specie Bank. Please have this in mind and do your best to secure their consent to this. The amount involved, unless some very special emergency should arise, will be as heretofore, and of course we will use it only within the limits of approval received from the Foreign Office and we will take the responsibility of its custody in this office.
Trans. 7‑29‑41
No. 265
FROM: Manila July 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 438.
(Request Message)
From MATSUKAWA to the President of the Tokyo Branch of the ISHIWARA Produce Company:
Money frozen this morning. For time being stop all remittances. Cannot hope to continue business as before, but can only take necessary measures to preserve existence of firm until things get better. Think it best policy to endeavor to bring about elasticity in quota system. Please get in touch with Home Office and work out counter policy.
Trans. 7‑31‑41
No. 266
FROM: Manila August 2, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 477.
# 55 from this office to the Ambassador in the United States.
Re your # 203 [a].
The High Commissioner here has advised me that Washington would grant permits and if this is done it will be very fortunate as you well know. With regard to this matter, we would be able to keep Davao advised of details which we have collected.
1. As you know, the secret funds used here are relatively high because of the status of the office. Consequently; in addition to paying monthly allowances to members of the staff we apportion personal entertainment allowances to them as designated in paragraphs of your # 4 [b].
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
These monies, after they have been received at this office, are immediately handed over to the members of the staff. Should you have no objection, we would like to have you arrange so that essential secret funds other than for purposes mentioned above can be utilized by us.
2. Subsidy monies for conferences we would like to apportion as heretofore providing you have no objections. (It is our intention to apportion hospital subsidy funds as well as monies for the use of companies in outlying sections.)
The above mentioned two points doubtless will prove of interest to other offices in the United States. Please send me your reply.
[a] See II, 252.
[b] Not available.
Trans. (Not dated)
No. 267
FROM: Manila July 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 449.
Some of the reactions and measures taken in this area in connection with the French Indo-China affair are described below:
1. For some time past, the people in this area have been convinced that Japan has had her hands full with the China affair. Moreover, it was popularly believed that a difference of opinion arose in Japan itself following the outbreak of the German‑Soviet war. For these reasons it was firmly believed here that Japan would make no southward move which would risk the necessity of a military campaign.
When our final note regarding French Indo‑China was published and when subsequently our forces showed signs of actually moving into French Indo‑China, the people here were caught more or less flat‑footed and there were indications of some confusion.
2. In view of the locale, considerable attention was centered on the attitude the United States would take regarding our move. With the issuance of Welles’ statement of the 24th, and the President’s speech of the 25th, it was reported that the United States was going to take strong retaliatory actions against Japan.
Particular attention was paid to that part of the President’s speech which promised that retaliatory action against Japan would be taken within twenty‑four hours, and also to Welles’ statement that developments in French Indo‑China will have important bearings on the fate of the entire Pacific including the Philippine Islands.
As soon as the order freezing our assets was announced, it was predicted here that that was only the first retaliatory step. It was further predicted that under certain circumstances an export embargo will be placed on shipments of oil and other war materials to Japan from the United States. (In his speech, the President stated that the reason no export embargo had been placed on oil shipments to Japan was because he took Japanese reaction over such a step into consideration. Men here refer to this part of the speech and point out that the President put all of it in the past tense, and thus, indirectly the President suggests a different future policy.)
Other probable steps, they claim, are the seizure of Japanese vessels. (This was rumored in the Customs circles); and the closing of Japanese consulates in the United States.
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3. With regard to the recent agreement with French Indo‑China, it is locally claimed that it was only as the result of application of pressure by Japan that it was agreed upon. Thus, the lack of resistance on the part of France was strongly censured. http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US
There are indications that the local people are considerably confused by various and varying rumors, such as reports to the effect that as a consequence of this agreement, the Japanese have obtained military bases; that Japanese vessels regularly coming to this area have been requisitioned or will cancel this service; that Japan is mobilizing at home on a gigantic scale; that foreigners may no longer travel, etc.
These have given rise to much confusion, wishful thinking, and anxiety, among the people here.
Trans. 7‑30‑41
No. 268
FROM: Honolulu (Kita) June 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 099.
Regarding the cable from San Francisco 4 92 to the Foreign Minister, which was interrupted. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
The President Pierce took on about 900 soldiers and 100 pilots on the 11th and sailed for the Philippines on the 12th.
Trans. 6‑19‑41
