[a] See IV, 186-189.
[b] See IV, 180-181.
[c] See IV, 182-185.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 193
FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1191.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 4.)
(To be handled in government code.)
(3) Concerning Section 1 of the proposal, I pointed out that of the four principles, the fourth has changed the so-called Stimson Doctrine; but I got no clear reply. I reminded him of their insistences so far concerning the principle of non-discrimination and said that if we applied that immediately to China there would be a sudden darkening of the already cloudy economic situation and that this was improper and impossible.
HULL replied: “I fully understand that and the principle as such does not necessarily have to be put into effect right away.”
(4) Concerning 1 of Section 2 of this proposal, I said: “If this plan aims to review a Nine-Power Treaty set-up, we cannot feature it at all because we have fought a four year war in China without a cent of profit.”
To this he countered with no strong rebuttal.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 194
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1191.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 3 of 4.)
(5) I said that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same section were out of the question and, as for paragraph 4, for a country like the United States, who recognizes the Chungking Government, to say that she cannot desert the Chiang Regime is just like us saying that we certainly cannot desert the Nanking Regime.”
In reply HULL said: “The evacuation under 3 would be carried out by negotiations. We are not necessarily asking that it be effected immediately. As for the Nanking Government, according to the best reports available to us, it hasn’t much influence over China as a whole any way.”
I retorted: “Well, that argument is based on the statement that in the long history of China there have been many rises and falls of governments.”
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(6) When we came to the question of the Three Power Treaty, I said: “For the United States to hope on one hand, that she can make us make the last possible concession regarding the Three Power Pact and on the other virtually to say to us concerning the China question “apologize to Chungking” is certainly strange. I do not suppose that that is what the President meant the other day when he spoke of ‘introducing’.” HULL made no special answer.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 195
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1191.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 4 of 4.)
I said: “Well, I have read this only cursorily. It is a very difficult plan for us to consider accepting. As far as the China part is concerned, it contains clauses which are entirely out of the question so I, who would like to see an understanding established between Japan and the United States, do not know if I should even report it to Japan as it now stands. I have grave doubts. We will both read it over again and consider it fully.http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG Then we will reply.” Finally I said, “I wonder if the United States means that there is no other way but for us to consider this plan. You know the President the other day said that between friends there are no last words. I wonder if you could arrange for an interview.” To the former he replied that in a word this was a plan and to the latter he said that, although he did not think that much progress was being made, he would manage the matter.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 196
FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo 1946 to 1953 EST
(Telephone Code.) [b]
Trans-Pacific Telephone
To Kumaicho Yamamoto [a] from Kurusu:
Kurusu: “I have made all efforts, but they will not yield. [c] I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already,” he interrupted himself, “you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how thing will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems.”
Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: “If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable.”
Yamamoto: “The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also.” After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: “The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult.”
Kurusu: “I believe it is of no avail.”
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Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.
Kurusu: “I rather imagine you had expected this outcome.”
Yamamoto: “Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished.”
Kurusu: “I am unable to make any movement (i.e., progress) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation.”
[a ]Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.
[b] See IV. 1,2.
[c] Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The Intercepter read this as “Sore . . . kesa” (that . . . this morning) and translated this as “it is now . . .”, with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to him. Verification will follow receipt of record.
Trans. 11 26-41
No. 197
Communications Intelligence Reports
Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets
Date of Issue Serial
November 26, 1941 22-41, No, 901-200
“Submitted by the 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit:
Since the latter part of October, the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet has been forming a task force consisting of:
Second Fleet
Third Fleet (including First and Second Base Forces, and First Defense Division)
Destroyer Squadron Three
Submarine Squadron Five
Combined Air Force
Air Squadron Seven and possibly vessels of the Third Battleship Division in the first fleet.
Third Fleet units are believed to be moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.
It appears that the Seventh Cruiser Division and the Third Destroyer Squadron are an advance unit, and may be enroute South China.
The Combined Air Force has assembled in Takao, and indications are that some of it has already moved on to Hainan Island.
It seems that the Second Base Force is transporting equipment of the Air Force to Taiwan.
Radio calls for the South China Fleet, the French Indo-China Force, and the Naval Stations at Sama, Bako and Takao appear also in headings of dispatches concerning this task force.
The Resident Naval Officer Palao, and the Third Base Force at Palao have communicated extensively with the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet.
It is thought that a strong force of submarines and air groups are in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. This force includes the 24th Air Squadron, at least one aircraft carrier, and probably one-third of the submarine fleet. (Note: this may mean one-third of the fleet submarines.)
The 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit evaluates the foregoing information to indicate that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts of the Task Force may operate from the Marshalls and Palao.”
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Com 14 260110 of November 1941 to OPNAV
Info: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 16.
No. 198
Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets
Date of Issue Serial
November 27, 1941 23-41, No, 901-200
“Following has been submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, referring to and commenting on yesterday’s information from the 14th Naval District Communication http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG Intelligence Unit, contained in the above reference.
During the past few days traffic analysis indicates that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, is directing units of the First, Second, and Third Fleets, and Submarine Force in a loose knit Task Force organization that apparently will be divided into two section. For purposes of clarity the units expected to operate in South China Area will be referred to as First Section and units expected to operate in the Mandates will be referred to as Second Section. The estimated units in First Section are Cruiser Division Seven, Air Squadron Six, Defense Division One, Destroyer Squadron Three, and Submarine Squadron Six. The Second Section consists of Cruiser Division Five, Carrier Division Three (RYUJO and one Maru), Destroyer Squadrons Two and Four, Submarine Squadron Five, Destroyer Division Twenty-three, First Base Force of Third Fleet, Third Base Force at Palao, Fifth Base Force at Saipan, and lesser units unidentified. Cruiser Division Six and Battleship Division Three may be included in First and Second Sections respectively, but status cannot be clarified yet.
There are slight indications today that Destroyer Squadron Three, Cruiser Division Seven, and Submarine Squadron Six are in the Takao Area. The balance of Third Fleet units in doubt but may be assume that these vessels including Destroyer Squadron 5 will take stations in the Straits of Formosa or further south. Combined Air Force units from the Empire proper are at Paidoh.
It is impossible to confirm the supposition of reference report that carriers and submarines are in the Mandates. The best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet Carriers are still in Sasebo-Kure Area.
…..Directives to the above Task Forces, if such, are directed to individual units, and not to complete groups. Special calls usually precede formation of Task Force used in area operations.
Commanders-in-Chief, Second, Third, and Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles.
Traffic from the Minister of the Navy and the Chief of Naval General Staff to Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet appears normal.
This evaluation is considered reliable.Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
COM 16 261331, Nov. 1941 to CINCPAC, COM 14, OPNAV, CINCAF.”
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No. 199
FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1190.
(Part 1 of 2.)
Judging from the progress of present Japanese-American relations, with which you are well acquainted through successive telegrams, the American proposal on the 26th (message # 11894) showed a great disparity between the demands of both parties. Unfortunately, there are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within the time limit you set.
Although we have requested the agreement of various countries to the numerous demands made, the United States presented this proposal after having conferred with the same countries. Although we cannot allow ourselves to be caught napping by this scheming, we must follow out instructions. Up to the present we have only been able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have not expressed any final intention. Even the President on the 17th said that there would be “no last words.” If we do not cause any stop in the present negotiations, in the case of taking independent action after the time set ——.
[a] See IV, 190, 191.
Trans. 11-28-41
No. 200
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1190.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 2.)
To be handled in Government Code.
The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.
Trans. 11-28-41
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http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 201
FROM: Washington November 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1204.
Re your # 842 [a].
The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands on subjects pertaining to U. S. claims and because we asked them to do so. In the midst of these talks, the White-House suddenly came forth with the announcement on the 24th, that the United States is occupying Dutch Guiana, with the agreement of the government of the Netherlands, for the purpose of protecting it.
As was made plain in the text of this announcement, the main objective of this occupation was to guarantee accessibility to aluminum produced there, which is vital to the national defense of the United States. Ordinarily, the Netherlands Government would dispatch its armed forces stationed in the Netherlands East Indies for this purpose, but she is unable to do so at present because of the present situation in the southwest Pacific area. For this reason, the U. S. Army is being used to protect the aluminum mines in that area. At the same time, at the invitation of the Netherlands Government, Brazil is also taking part in protecting them.
The Netherlands Foreign Minister stopped in the United States en route to visiting the Netherlands East Indies, and conferred with U. S. Government officials. Since then, there has been a considerable increase in the amount of military supplies being shipped to the Netherlands East Indies; the traffic of technicians and experts between the United States and N.E.I., has swung up sharply. From these indications as well as from the history of the Netherlands East Indies, it is believed, that depending upon the atmosphere at the time the Japanese-U. S. negotiations break off, Britain and the United States may occupy the Netherlands East Indies. They will do this, probably, much in the same manner as U. S.-Brazil joint occupation of Netherlands Guiana, in the name of protecting the products of the N.E.I. which are vital to national defense, tin and rubber.
I feel that it is essential that we give careful consideration to this possibility. I made reference to this point in my message # 1180 [b]. The gist of this message does not differ from that contained in that message.
[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 170, 171.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 202
FROM: OPNAV November 26, 1941
TO: CINCAF # 271442.
For the purpose of remedying the unintentional omission of CINCAF, in the forthcoming revision of WPL 46, para 3744 will be amended. If formal war eventuates between U. S. and Japan “Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare May 1941″ will be placed in effect. This will however be supplemented by additional instructions including authority to CINCAF to conduct unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against Axis shipping within that part of the Far East area lying south and west of a line joining Lat 30 N Long 122 E and Lat 7 N Long 140 E. You will declare this as a strategical area. You will warn all friendly, enemy and neutral merchant ships and aircraft to refrain from entering this
A-109
strategical area—except under certain specified conditions—in your proclamation. You will state that this step is necessary to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft from supporting hostile action and to prevent them from obtaining info which if transmitted to the enemy would be seriously detrimental to armed forces of the U. S. The only conditions under which friendly and neutral merchant vessels may enter the strategical area will be through certain prescribed lanes that lead to Naval control stations. You are requested to take up the matter of defining and establishing these lanes and control stations with the Dutch and British Naval authorities, but take care not to disclose for the present these instructions to wage unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare. The situation will be far more complex if hostilities ensue without a formal declaration of war, but it appears probable that very nearly the same procedure will be followed. However, further advice must be received from CNO before this is done.
No. 203
FROM: OPNAV November 28, 1941
TO: CINCAF # 271912 CR 0863.
Request from the Army Chief of Staff that you inform General MacArthur of the contents of my 271442 so that Army air forces may make appropriate plans.
No. 204
FROM: CNO November 26, 1941
TO: CINCPAC # 270040 CR 0756.
If you consider this desirable, Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for re-enforcing defense battalions now on station x For advance bases which you may occupy, Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops but is unable at this time to provide any anti-aircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable the recommended armament and number of troops desired x
No. 205
FROM: CNO November 26, 1941
TO: CINCPAC # 270038 CR 0758.
Provided you consider this feasible and desirable and in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier x Essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels and planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats x Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents x Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies x Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers in Philippines x If necessary, additional parking areas should be laid prompt-
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
ly x Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations x As soon as practicable, confer with Commanding General and advise x
