No. 1064A
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) September 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo #968.
Re your # 543 [a].
Thinking it would be well to sound out the attitude of the Dutch once more, I explained to ROOFINKU the official in charge of the bureau, Japan’s friendly attitude in allowing the use of the Dutch language, and stated that it would be to the advantage of both parties for the international telephone service to be continued on the condition that the use of the Japanese language be permitted in return. RO replied that with martial law in force now, the prospects of permission to use the Japanese language are meager.
Accordingly I think it is best to suspend the international telephone service. If it is suspended please have your office advise Minister Pabst, or else have the Ministry of Communications advise the communications authorities of the Netherlands Indies, and report the results to me by dispatch.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 9-13-41
A-488
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 1065
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1184.
Recently I have had to write KUROKI in Dilly, Timor on frequent occasions as well as receive messages from him. Because of the telegraphic work involved, please arrange to send him (in care of the Japanese Consul in Dilly) code books, abbreviated transmission code, as well as telegraphic addresses at as early a date as possible.
Trans. 11-8-41
No. 1067
FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 6, 1941
TO: Batavia #695.
A telegram from Staff Headquarters.
The Vice Chief Manager wishes you to pass on the following orders to Lt. KURIYA.
1. You are ordered home for the time being. You will come by airplane, contacting the military attaché at Bangkok in Siam and the wealth (“tomi”) group in Saigon.
2. Your successor will be Lt. Toyoaki YAMAUCHI. Since Lt. YAMAUCHI’s arrival at his post may be delayed in order to acquire his papers, no matter what the progress of the above papers you are permitted to leave your post.
3. Until the arrival of your successor, we are asking SATORU SHIMPO, a Domei news service man in Batavia, and YOSHIO MATSUGAKI, the Consul in Soerabaja, to take charge of your research.
The above are the balance of the orders.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 1068
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1186.
(Military Secret.)
Please transmit this message to the Vice War Minister and to the Vice Chief of Staff (please transmit to Military Attaché TAIWA) .
Java Message # 30. (Strictly Secret.) (Urgent.)
From KURIYA.
1. I am in receipt of your order.
2. I shall return on board the Takachiho Maru sailing from Batavia on the 10th, since there is considerable danger of my losing the opportunity by being interrupted by the British if I should go by way of Bangkok. I expect to arrive on the 24th or the 25th. Please be so informed.
Furthermore, if I am to take up my new work immediately from Formosa, I would like to receive your instructions at Keelung (about the 20th).
Trans. 11-15-41
A-489
No. 1069
FROM: Medan (Hyasaki) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 151.
(Part 1 of 2.) [a]
Reports from Malaysians became uncertain, so I had RAJAMURA through his friend ISUNAIRU [b], an employee of the Forestry Department under MANDERINGU [b], make inquiries of PAZUAKIMU [b], who is preparing to destroy the Purura [b] oil refineries.
1. The destruction forces are divided into two groups, both of which get double pay.
2. They are ready to destroy all the oil fields in SUSU [b] and Brandan when advised so to do by telephone. The refineries at Susu, Brandan and Rantoo [b] are fully mined and ready to explode. At present Dara- [b] and Purura are being prepared.
3. Preparations to destroy Susu are as I have already told you. However, the wire net is very near the machinery.
4. The machinery at Brandan is connected to the post office on the premises of the workers’ barracks by a short wire. Three short wires —– from those three places —– —– —– —–.
[a] Part 2 not available.
[b] Kana spelling.
Trans. 11-28-41
No. 1070
FROM: Medan (Hayasake) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 152.
1. RAJYAMURA [b] .
a. The Netherlands East Indies authorities are understood to have turned over to all Sorutan [b] sealed secret orders, the sealing wax of which is to be broken in the event of war .When we inquired of RANKATUTO, Chief of the Emergency (Bureau) of this matter, he said, “I do not know for sure whether the Sorutan [b] is to keep these instructions in his possession, but the office in charge will do its best to quiet the unrest of the people within their jurisdiction and make preparations for the laying in of foodstuffs.
b. In front of the Emergency Bureau there is a sign which says that in the event war becomes imminent, the people are to cease their labors and must not congregate unnecessarily.
c. They are preparing 100 swords which are to be placed in the fields ready for harvest along the eastern seacoast. The scabbards for these swords are being constructed by Chinese. In the event of war, they will be given to persons of trust to be used in the protection of the natives.
2. Re the village I mentioned in my # 142 [b].
a. This village has been given the charge of constructing an automobile road into the mountains from the oil wells. This virtually has been completed. The fact is that these roads have been constructed in order to avoid congestion on the national highways.
b. In Borneo, too, they have constructed similar roads, cannon have been placed at strategic points, and mines have been laid.
[a] Kana spelling.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 12-5-41
A-490
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 1071
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1206.
1. On the 11th I visited SUPITTAI [a], Vice Governor-General, for an hour, and we went over the developments between the two countries.
I stated, “Japan has joined in with Germany, and Holland became allied with England. The object of the German-Japanese union was clearly expressed in the treaty signed by them. It was to prevent the spread of the European war to the whole world, and that the agreement was no direct threat to the Dutch East Indies. I have been endeavoring since arriving here to realize my conviction that an improvement of diplomatic and economic relations between Japan and the Dutch East Indies could be achieved by my driving home to the Dutch East Indian authorities the fact that they were not threatened as a consequence of Japanese advancement in southern French Indo-China. The Netherlanders, feeling a direct threat to the Dutch East Indies, changed to an anti-Japanese political policy, and I regret that such a state of affairs had been reached which makes reconciliation difficult.”
SUPITTAI said, “All of the Dutch East Indian authorities have remarked that you have been struggling to the fullest, from the beginning to the end, to improve relations between the two countries, but with the advance of the Japanese into the southern part of French indo-China, there was a sudden hardening of the Dutch East Indian officials and people. Although the mother country is Holland, I as an individual pursue an independent political course. I realize the difficult questions facing Japan. The Japanese idea is to establish a new order in East Asia and to be the leader of the peoples in that area. The Netherlanders do not desire that new order, as they do not wish to come under Japanese domination and tutelage.”
I replied, “I must emphasize that such is not Japan’s plan. The idea of the Japanese people at any time or place has always been based upon justice. Great Britain, the United States and Holland have been selfish in using the resources of the world, and we cannot allow that to continue. How is it possible that the Dutch East Indies cannot understand our idea?” Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
SUPITTAI answered, “Holland has not been selfish. She has supplied the whole world with her resources. We understand the Japanese idea, so we refuse to accept it.”
I asked, ” Just what is meant by that statement?”
SUPITTAI explained, “The intentions of Japan are exactly the same as those of Germany, as shown by the invasion of Chosen, Manchuria, China, Hainan, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands, Spratley Islands and French Indo-China. It must be known that French Indo-China did not like Japan’s idea but they gave in finally .”
I retorted, “I am shocked by this. Throughout many years of history our intentions and aims have always been based upon justice.” (I emphasized that compared to England, American and Dutch invasions, Japanese expansion is justified.) SUPITTAI replied in this manner: “It is as you say but judging from the historic actions and trends of Japan, her policy is exactly the same as the German theory of racial supremacy. Consequently there is now a threat to the Dutch East Indies. The Dutch East Indies do not want to fight, but they are not afraid to do so.”
2. The essence of this interview must not leak outside the Department.
[a] Kana spelling, spit. (sic)
Trans. 11-22-41
No. 1072
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 1209.
A-491
Re your # 706 [a]: Strictly Confidential.
With reference various problems in connection with the dispatch of the Fuji Maru, there is no hope of any business in the future, and the retail merchants and others should be evacuated. They are preparing to close their shops and withdraw by the end of December. I have been keeping in touch with the Army and Navy authorities, and about the 10th we agreed that a steamer should be sent here late in December or early in January. If the international situation should compel the Government to sacrifice our nationals here-and there are many who want to leave-this would rapidly become a serious problem. Please let me know your wishes so that I can be competent to give advice to the local Japanese who want to withdraw.
In order to give the right advice, and proper orders, definite instructions are necessary. If this office should have conflicting orders it would be like a thunder-storm in a clear sky to our nationals here. Local travel is becoming increasingly inconvenient, and the many Japanese nationals living in scattered areas are closing their houses and gathering in Batavia, in anticipation of the Fuji Maru’s arrival on the 28th. If it is absolutely impossible to dispatch the vessel until mid-December, please inform me at once by telegraph, and also as to the passenger capacity of the ship and any other information.
[a] See IV, 1061.
Trans. 11-18-41
No. 1073
FROM: Tokyo November 13, 1941
TO: Batavia # 707.
Chief of Office routing.
Japanese nationals familiar with conditions in the Dutch East Indies and those knowing the languages should now return home.
(1) This group of Japanese should include those engaged in farming, and employees of firms, leaving behind only the head officers most essential. The Consul at each place should give each case careful consideration on its own merits, deciding as to whether or not those remaining behind are absolutely essential. This is important to our policy of withdrawing Japanese nationals and the assignment of a steamer for that purpose. The order for the withdrawal to Japan will soon be issued to you by way of precaution, which will include the fore-going points.
(2) When this occurs, the men should be selected promptly and those going to Japan on this steamer be advised promptly of the necessity of this. Further, the evacuees should pay careful attention to making it seem to both natives and foreigners that the evacuation is a spontaneous withdrawal.
(3) The gist of this message should be secretly transmitted to Medan, Soerabaja, Menado, Makassar, as soon as possible.
Trans. 11-19-41
No. 1074
FROM: Batavia November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1213
(Extremely Urgent.)
Re your # 707 [a].
A-492
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Until I received your telegram the other day, I could not begin to guess wherein lay the policy of our department, so I was very much worried. When I received this message of yours, for the first time I knew what your policy was. Of course, I will do my best, but I do not believe that it would be at all possible for me to have as many people board ships as you expect. Please look at the facts and consider the difficulty I face. This telegram left the encoder’s hand at 5:30 local time.
[a] See IV., 1073.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 1075
FROM: Tokyo November 16, 1941
TO: Batavia # 716.
(Extremely Urgent.)
Part 1 of 2. Secret. Re my # 707 [a].
As a result of conferences which we have held with the interested companies, please transmit the following with the utmost speed and secrecy to the various company managers. While we sympathize with staffs of the firms, they are urgently requested to endeavor to maintain business as usual under present conditions.
1. Medan District.
(a) Tozan Agricultural Products. If possible without interfering with the maintenance of business, on the discretion of AJIYAMU [b] three or four men may return to Japan.
(b) Showa Rubber. On the discretion of PUROMANDE [b] about two members of the staff may return to Japan.
(c) Sumatra Colonization. On the discretion of ZUSUNWURUU [b] make the necessary arrangements for one or two men to return to Japan, leaving a proper person in charge and employ YOTO.
(e) South Seas Rubber. Since TANAHITAMUHIRIRU [b] has not enough strength left to evacuate, work hard together.
(f) Tropical Industries. After effecting a contract for management of the Mitsui New Tropical Rubber Plantation through a dependable agent, it is all right to evacuate. However, arrange that the contract may be cancelled on from three to six months’ notice after management is actually transferred. Other details are left to you.
[a] See IV, 1073.
[b] Kana spelling
Trans. 11-21-41
No. 1076
FROM: Tokyo November 16, 1941
TO: Batavia # 716.
(Extremely Urgent.) Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Part 2 of 2.
(g) Nomura. After setting up a contract between Nomura Supply Company and Guthrie, commence turning over the business. List the trust items http://Louis1J1Sheehan1Esquire.us transferred from the accounts of the Medan Trading Company to Karanyine [a]. We will wire again about future details.
A-493
2. Batavia district.
(a) Ogura. It is all right to send back any from the South Countries Company whom you think should return. Plan to entrust all our deposits to ESUKONTO [a], and if it is possible to make the preparations, go ahead. We leave it to you whether or not you stay.
(b) Nomura. Set up a contract between the Nomura Supply Company and HONDERUSU [a], including general management and the Meteor (?) steel works and commence turning over the business. Even though they again propose the purchase of both factories, make a strong effort to secure loans of trade articles and raw materials. Encourage talks with the aim of getting HONDERUSU [a] to take over a simple lease on a friendly footing. Arrange the above details also in Batavia, Pontiana, and Surabaya. We will wire further details later .
3. Surabaya District.
To KONDO of the Dutch East Indies Development Company in Bandjermasin. After making suitable arrangements for management of the business return to Japan on the first available boat. As for KODAMA, we leave it to him whether he stays or not.
Please make the necessary connections with Surabaya and Medan at once.
[a] Kana spelling.
Trans. 11-21-41
No. 1077
FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 14, 1941
TO: Batavia # 712.
(Urgent.)
(Strictly Secret.)
The negotiations about which I told you in my # 711 [a] are going to be precarious. If the fact that we are holding them leaks out to our residents, they might get the impression that the outlook is very hopeful and decide not to leave the country. We might not get as many people as we expect on the Fuji Maru so please be careful not to let any of our residents learn anything about these negotiations.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11-20-41
No. 1078
FROM: Batavia November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1182.
Request telegram.
To the President of the Specie Bank from Imagawa.
In today’s conference the question came up as to why the 5000 yen that should have been
paid to the Dutch Consul General in Kobe on October 16th had not yet been paid. Since it is necessary to give an answer please wire the circumstances immediately. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Furthermore, let me request again an answer to my plain language telegram # 30 [a]. Please wire an answer immediately to my plain language telegram # 31 [a].
A-494
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
A proposal was made to approve the wiring of 100,000 yen to cover the expenses of the Dutch merchants for permitting the export of 4000 tons of maize loaded on the Takachiho Maru and Nissho Maru.
Please get the details from the Foreign Office.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11-7-41
No. 1079
FROM: Tokyo November 11, 1941
TO: Batavia # 633.
(Abstract. )
Re your #1084 [a].
Re N.E.I. trade. We can’t even consider the insincere proposals made by the Netherlands. Conduct negotiations for bartering of each ship load of goods as independent transaction.
[a] Not available
Trans. 11-19-41
No. 1080
FROM: Batavia (Isizawa) November 21, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1245.
Re your 6974.
From the director of the Exchange Control Bureau to Imagawa.
It is said that the telegraphic money order (for 60,000 yen) of the 12th, sent to FUWAKUTORAI has not yet been paid, and the Director inquired as to the reason for this. If this is actually a fact, it is highly to be deplored as it is concerned with the obtention of the permit for the export of the maize loaded on the Tokatiho Maru and the Nissho Maru. Please get in touch with the Finance Ministry immediately regarding this and if it has not been paid, please arrange for the carrying out of our promises.
Please ascertain at the same time as to whether the 40,000 yen for the Handels Bank has been paid and wire a reply immediately.
[a] Not available,
